Should the Jury Be Instructed as to the Consequences of a Successful Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Verdict? A Comment on Shannon v. United States
Introduction
In Shannon v. United States,(1) the United States Supreme Court held that a federal district judge was not required to instruct juries with regard to the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict (NGI).(2) The Shannon decision is important because the Supreme Court finally resolved this unsettled area of law that had varied from circuit to circuit.(3) The Court focused on the role of the jury as a factfinder and held that its verdict should be based solely on the facts, not on the consequences of its verdict.(4) Moreover, the Court rejected petitioner Terry Lee Shannon's argument that an interpretation of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA)(5) required judges to instruct juries as to the resulting outcome of an NGI verdict.(6)
However, as the dissent noted, the Court apparently disregarded the fact that the average juror does consider what will happen to the defendant after the verdict is rendered.(7) The dissent also rejected the majority's opinion that the legislative history of the IDRA does not require the judge to give an instruction outlining the consequences of an NGI verdict.(8) Rather, the dissent argued that the history clearly reflected that the IDRA requires that such an instruction be given whenever requested by the defendant.(9)
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the Shannon Court's rationale in holding that an instruction regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict is not required by a federal district court judge, even at the defendant's request. Part II.A of this Comment reviews the historical underpinnings of the role of the jury.(10) Part II.B addresses the various decisions of courts which have addressed this issue prior to the IDRA.(11) Part II.C describes the significant changes in the federal law with the enactment of the IDRA,(12) and Part II.D addresses several courts' differing rationales on the issue of instructing the jury, since the passage of the IDRA.(13) Part III.A specifically examines the facts and prior proceedings of Shannon v. United States.(14) Part III.B explores the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Shannon,(15) while Part III.C considers the dissent.(16) Part IV of this Comment compares and contrasts the majority's and the dissent's reasoning, and intertwines the rationales from other jurisdictions.(17) Part V presents a brief conclusion.(18)
Background
A. Role of the Jury
The traditional role of the jury is to decide issues of fact, while the judge decides issues of law.(19) "The rationale for this separation of functions rests on the different competencies of the judge and jury,"(20) and "a reflection of the basic division of labor in our legal system."(21) Judges are better equipped to decide the technical issues raised by the law,(22) while "[j]uries, on the other hand, are better equipped to make judgments about everyday facts."(23) The jury is to weigh the facts and decide whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged based on those facts alone, not based upon the ultimate punishment that may be imposed.(24) In contrast, the judge imposes the sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived at a guilty verdict.(25) Therefore, information regarding the consequences of the verdict is irrelevant to the jury's task.(26)
Because of this separation of functions, criminal courts have historically held it inappropriate for juries to be informed of the consequences of their verdicts.(27) Where such a duty rests solely with the court, a jury instruction informing jurors about the consequences of their verdict would be considered inappropriate since it would not aid the jurors in deciding guilt or innocence and, in fact, may "lead them to base their verdict on [the consequences] rather than on the law and evidence."(28) Very often, jurors are even specifically instructed not to consider issues of sentencing or punishment.(29) Courts have generally held that providing jurors with information regarding the ultimate consequences of sentencing tends to distract them from their factfinding responsibilities and creates a strong possibility of confusion.(30) Due primarily to these fears, the majority of courts have held it inappropriate to inform juries as to the consequences of their verdicts.(31)
B. Pre-IDRA Decisions
Prior to the enactment of the IDRA, the majority of courts refused to instruct juries about the consequences of their verdicts in cases in which defendants pled insanity.(32) The reason the juries were not instructed was because defendants who successfully pled an insanity defense were simply found "not guilty."(33) Subsequent treatment of the insane defendant depended on separate state civil commitment procedures.(34) Hence, there was no guarantee that the defendant would be institutionalized as a result of these state proceedings or simply set free.(35) To raise an insanity defense, the defendant was required to raise a "reasonable doubt" as to his or her legal sanity and then the burden shifted to the government to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.(36) Thus, affirmative proof was not necessary, and an acquittal based on insanity did not automatically result in civil commitment.(37)
Basically, there were two reasons for the refusal to give the instructions. First, the courts pointed out that in the absence of a federal commitment procedure,(38) the consequences of an insanity acquittal were far from certain.(39) Second, "such [an] instruction[] would run afoul of the well-established principle that a jury is to base its verdict on the evidence before it, without regard to the possible consequences of the verdict."(40) These rationales were set forth in Pope v. United States(41) and in United States v. Portis.(42)
1. Pope v. United States
In 1962, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pope v. United States(43) held that the district court properly refused the instruction that the defendant had requested.(44) First, the court of appeals reasoned that jurors decide issues of fact, while judges impose the sentence after the facts have been decided by the jury.(45) The court of appeals feared that instructing the jury as to the consequences of its verdict would greatly increase the risk of confusing the issues and of reaching a compromised verdict.(46) The court of appeals stated the following:
To inform the jury that the court may impose minimum or maximum sentence, will or will not grant probation, when a defendant will be eligible for a parole, or other matters relating to disposition of the defendant, tend to draw the attention of the jury away from their chief function as sole judges of the facts, open the door to compromise verdicts and to confuse the issue or issues to be decided.(47)
Furthermore, the court of appeals held that an instruction, such as the one requested by the defendant, would be a misstatement of the law.(48) The defendant's requested instruction seemed to suggest that the court could thereafter commit the defendant.(49) However, "[a]s a matter of fact, it [was] doubtful that the trial court could lawfully commit a defendant to Saint Elizabeths Hospital, after acquittal, as stated in the requested and refused charge."(50) The district court failed to state a reason why it could not commit an NGI defendant. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the instruction regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict had been properly denied.(51)
2. United States v. Portis
In a reason similar to the one rendered in the Pope opinion, the court in United States v. Portis(52) refused to give the instruction requested by the defendant,(53) holding that the instruction "inadequately stated the law and that it could possibly confuse the jury."(54) The defendant argued that jurors should be instructed as to the consequences of a successful insanity defense.(55) Otherwise, the defendant maintained, many jurors would be "hesitant to acquit a defendant on the basis of his insanity [for] fear an acquittal [would] turn loose on the community a person who may engage in further antisocial conduct."(56) Therefore, the defendant urged, an instruction concerning the disposition of an NGI defendant was necessary to ensure a fair trial.(57)
However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument because there was no legal basis for the assumption that the defendant would be committed if acquitted by reason of insanity.(58)
"It appear[ed] . . . that a trial court would indeed be engaging in unwarranted judicial activism to attempt to instruct the jury as to the status of the federal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity when there is such a complete lack of guidelines to determine just what the disposition would be."(59)
Consequently, the court held that the trial judge had not erred in refusing to give the defendant's requested instruction.(60)
While the courts in both Pope and Portis, as well as in the majority of jurisdictions, upheld the policy of refusing to instruct jurors as to the consequences of an NGI verdict, the District of Columbia took a different approach and endorsed the practice of instructing the jury.(61)
3. Lyles v. United States
Although the majority of the federal courts have refused to instruct juries on the consequences of a successful insanity defense, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit) took a different approach, and endorsed the practice of instructing the jury on these consequences.(62) The reason the D.C. Circuit took a different approach was because the law in the District of Columbia regarding the defense of NGI was very different than what had prevailed in all other federal circuits.(63) Namely, the D.C. Circuit was governed by a statute--District of Columbia Code section 24-301--which specifically provided for a verdict of NGI and a civil commitment procedure.(64)
The Lyles court recognized the "well established and sound [doctrine], that the jury has no concern with the consequences of a verdict, either in the sentence, if any, or in the nature or extent of it, or in probation," but held that the doctrine did not apply to the situation before it because of the applicable statute.(65) Hence, unlike the jurisdictions in Pope and Portis, an NGI verdict in the D.C. Circuit would result in an automatic commitment.(66)
Furthermore, the court in Lyles stressed that jurors were already aware of the meanings of the verdicts "guilty" and "not guilty."(67) While it is common knowledge that a not guilty verdict means that the defendant goes free and that a guilty verdict means that the defendant is subject to court-imposed punishment, it is not as clearly understood what a verdict of NGI means.(68) The court found that "the jury ha[d] a right to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts."(69) Therefore, the court concluded, whenever the defense of insanity is raised, the trial judge is required to instruct the jury as to the legal meaning and consequences of such a verdict.(70) The court also held that if it appeared affirmatively on the record that the defense did not want such an instruction, failure to give it would not be grounds for reversal.(71)
Since the Lyles opinion is applicable as to the statutes in force in the District of Columbia, the opinion has limited applicability. However, since the Lyles opinion, Congress enacted the IDRA which set out mandatory commitment procedures, similar to those used in the District of Columbia.(72) Nevertheless, in spite of the enactment of a federal commitment procedure, there are still arbitrary results among courts which have addressed the issue of whether an instruction regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict should be given.(73)
C. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984
Prompted by the acquittal of John Hinckley(74) on charges stemming from his attempt on President Reagan's life, and in response to the public's outrage about the failings of federal treatment of the insanity defense, Congress examined the insanity defense as it operated in the federal courts and enacted the IDRA.(75) The Act made significant changes in the federal treatment of the insanity defense.(76) Prior to the enactment of the IDRA, the prosecution had to prove a defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.(77) The IDRA, however, made insanity an affirmative defense, shifting the burden to the defendant to establish insanity by clear and convincing evidence.(78) Most importantly, Congress created a separate and distinct verdict of NGI(79) and created a comprehensive civil commitment procedure whereby a person found NGI at the time of the offense would be committed to a suitable facility.(80) Under this commitment procedure, if a defendant were found NGI, he or she would be examined and have another court hearing within forty days of the verdict.(81) At this second hearing, the defendant would have the burden of proving that he or she is no longer mentally ill or dangerous,(82) and then the court would be required to determine whether the defendant should be hospitalized or released.(83) Thereafter, those defendants who were hospitalized would not be eligible for release until they were able to demonstrate that they posed no substantial risk of bodily injury to another and posed no risk of damage to the property of another.(84)
Although significant changes were made in the insanity defense, the issue of whether judges should give jurors an instruction as to the consequences of the newly-defined NGI verdict was not addressed. The only mention of the issue appears in a report from the Senate Judiciary Committee:
The Committee endorses the procedure used in the District of Columbia whereby the jury, in a case in which the insanity defense has been raised, may be instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. If the defendant requests that the instruction not be given, it is within the discretion of the court whether to give it or not.(85)
Since the passage of the IDRA, the issue of whether a jury should be informed of the consequences of an NGI verdict has been addressed by various courts, and has resulted in various outcomes.(86)
D. Post-IDRA Decisions
1. United States v. Neavill
In 1989, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Neavill(87) departed from its previous holding in Pope v. United States(88) and held that the jury should have been informed of the consequences of an NGI verdict.(89) The court noted that its prior decision in Pope was based on clear distinctions from the Lyles opinion,(90) namely that the District of Columbia was the only federal circuit which provided for a separate verdict of NGI and for commitment in the event of such a verdict.(91) In the other circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, a federal jury had to choose between either guilty or not guilty, and the consequences of an insanity verdict were rather unclear.(92) In light of the recent passage of the IDRA, however, the Neavill court concluded that a different result was in order, and that an instruction regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict was proper.(93)
The court set forth three reasons why such an instruction would now be appropriate. First, the Neavill court reasoned that, under the IDRA, there was now a separate verdict of NGI and a federal commitment procedure.(94) Second, the Neavill court relied on the legislative history of the IDRA, holding that the history endorsed the "`procedure used in the District of Columbia whereby the jury, in a case in which the insanity [defense] has been raised, may be instructed on the effect of the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.'"(95) Finally, the court reasoned that when an instruction is absent, the risk is too great that jurors may incorrectly assume that a defendant who is found NGI will go free.(96) Under such an impression, the Court reasoned, the jury may return a guilty verdict simply to ensure commitment.(97)
2. United States v. Thigpen
In 1993 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Thigpen,(98) addressed the same issue of whether the jury, in light of the IDRA, should be instructed as to the consequences of an NGI verdict.(99) Unlike the Neavill court, the Thigpen court answered in the negative.(100) The defendants unsuccessfully argued that an instruction was required by the IDRA on its face, or in the alternative, that it was required due to express legislative intent.(101) The court determined that the statute was unambiguous,(102) and since a statement of legislative intent does not have the "force of law" and can only "interpret or explain ambiguous language," the court had no authority to give effect to the legislative history in this situation.(103) Moreover, the court felt that by providing such an instruction, the judge may distract the jury from its sole function as the factfinder and encourage a verdict based on the consequences of the verdict, rather than on the evidence.(104) The requested instruction would require the court to "disregard the established canon that juries are not to be informed of or concerned with the consequences of their verdicts."(105) The court concluded that juries should not be concerned with the consequences of an NGI verdict and, therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting the instruction proposed by the defendant.(106)
3. United States v. Blume
While the Neavill court endorsed the instruction,(107) and the Thigpen court rejected it,(108) the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of United States v. Blume,(109) held that the decision of whether to give the jury such an instruction should be left to the discretion of the trial judge.(110) The court's rationale was based on a strict reading of a Senate Judiciary Committee report that read:
[T]he jury, in a case in which the insanity defense has been raised, may be instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant requests that an instruction not be given, it is within the discretion of the court whether to give it or not.(111)
The court "read this language to leave the instructional decision to the discretion of the district court."(112)
While only brief summations, these three cases clearly illustrate the unsettled status of the law in this area. This uncertainty subjected criminal defendants to arbitrary results and resulted in miscarriages of justice.(113) Ultimately, in June 1994, the Supreme Court resolved this uncertainty in Shannon v. United States.(114)
Shannon v. United States
A. Facts of the Case and Procedural History
On August 25, 1990, petitioner Terry Lee Shannon was stopped by a police officer in a Mississippi town.(115) Shannon, a convicted felon, was asked to accompany the officer to the police station for reasons not disclosed in the record.(116) Shannon refused, told the officer he did not want to live anymore, walked across the street, reached inside his coat, and pulled out a pistol with which he shot himself in the chest.(117) Shannon survived and was indicted for the unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.(118) Shannon pled insanity and requested that the jury be instructed that if an NGI verdict was returned, Shannon would be involuntarily committed to a state hospital.(119) The district court refused and instead instructed the jury "`to apply the law as [instructed] regardless of the consequence,' and that `punishment . . . should not enter [its] consideration or discussion.'"(120) During the course of deliberation, the foreperson sent a note to the judge asking for an explanation on insanity.(121) In response, however, the court simply restated the instruction previously given.(122) The jury returned a guilty verdict and the judge then sentenced Shannon to fifteen years without the possibility of probation or parole.(123)
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,(124) and noted that under its "pre-IDRA precedent, juries were not to be instructed concerning the consequences of an insanity acquittal."(125) The court of appeals observed that, since Congress mentioned nothing about instructing jurors as to the consequences of an NGI verdict within the IDRA itself, the court would "adhere to the established axiom that it is inappropriate for a jury to consider or be informed about the consequences of its verdict."(126)
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in order to resolve this issue and to determine "whether federal district courts [were] required to instruct juries with regard to the consequences of an NGI verdict."(127)
B. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court, by a vote of seven to two,(128) affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.(129) Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that it is not required that a jury be instructed as to the consequences of an NGI verdict.(130)
The Shannon Court emphasized the principle that, within the judicial system, there is a "basic division of labor . . . between judge and jury" which discourages jurors from considering the consequences of their verdicts.(131) The jurors are the finders of fact.(132) The judge, on the other hand, is the finder of the law, who imposes the sentence upon the defendant after the jury returns a guilty verdict.(133) The Court feared that providing the jurors with information concerning the consequence of the verdict would "invite[] them to ponder matters that are not within their province, distract[] them from their factfinding responsibilities, and create[] a strong possibility of confusion."(134)
As a basis for this decision, the Court endorsed the case of Rogers v. United States,(135) a case in which it was held that "when a jury has no sentencing function, it should be admonished to `reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed.'"(136) In Rogers, the jury, after deliberating for two hours, sent a note to the judge asking whether he would accept a verdict of "[g]uilty as charged with extreme mercy of the Court."(137) The judge answered affirmatively and five minutes later the jury came back with a verdict as indicated on the note.(138) The Supreme Court in Rogers held that this was improper, and that the trial judge should have told the jury that its recommendation was not binding.(139) Furthermore, the judge should have admonished the jury to reach its verdict without regard to the ultimate sentence.(140)
Shannon proceeded to argue that, under the IDRA, the court is required to give an instruction to the jury whenever the defendant requests such an instruction.(141) The Court addressed this argument by first looking to the text of the IDRA.(142) The Court held that since the IDRA does not specifically mention anything about informing the jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict,(143) the defendant's argument was without merit.(144)
Shannon argued further that Congress had implicitly adopted the D.C. Circuit's decision in Lyles,(145) where the instruction is endorsed, by modeling the IDRA after the District of Columbia Code.(146) In support of his argument that Lyles v. United States(147) should be followed, Shannon cited to Carolene Products Co. v. United States,(148) a case in which the Court held that, when a statute adopts its wording from another jurisdiction, that "`wording . . . carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording.'"(149) In further support of this familiar canon of interpretation, Shannon relied upon Capital Traction Co. v. Hof.(150) In Capital Traction, the Court stated that whenever Congress borrows provisions from state statutes, any known and settled construction of those borrowed provisions are "`deemed to have been adopted by Congress together with the text which it expounded, and the provisions must be construed as they were understood at the time in the State.'"(151)
The Court, while recognizing this canon of interpretation, opined that Congress did not "borrow" the terms from the District of Columbia Code, but rather significantly departed from its provisions.(152) Specifically, four distinctions were pointed out. First, under the IDRA, the defendant must prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence,(153) while under the District of Columbia statute, the defendant is only required to prove it by a preponderance of evidence.(154) Second, the commitment hearing under the IDRA must be held within forty days of the verdict,(155) while under the District of Columbia statute, it must be held within fifty days.(156) Third, under the IDRA, a defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is entitled to release if the offense involved bodily injury to another or serious damage to another's property, or the substantial risk thereof.(157) Under the District of Columbia statute, only the preponderance of evidence standard is required.(158) The fourth and final distinction noted by the Court was that, in the IDRA, Congress rejected the test for insanity that had been used in the District of Columbia statute.(159) Under the District of Columbia law, courts defined insanity as either the "lack of substantial capacity to conform one's conduct to the requirements of the law or the lack of substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's acts."(160) Instead, Congress deemed a person insane "if he [or she] is unable `to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.'"(161) Based on these distinctions, the Court concluded that Congress did not implicitly adopt the Lyles endorsement of an instruction when the IDRA was enacted, and therefore, the traditional canon of interpretation was simply not applicable to this case.(162)
Shannon also pointed to a statement in the Senate Report(163) and argued, in the alternative, that Congress's intent to follow Lyles was made perfectly clear in the legislative history.(164) The Court nevertheless rejected this argument.(165) Although there are differing views as to what weight legislative history is to be given to interpreting statutes, the Court held that "[it was] not aware of any case . . . in which [it gave] authoritative weight to a single passage of legislative history that [was] in no way anchored in the text of the statute."(166) Therefore, the Court concluded that it had no authority to enforce this principle.(167)
In his final argument, Shannon proposed that this instruction was necessary as a "matter of general federal criminal practice" because jurors may be unfamiliar with the consequences of an NGI verdict and may erroneously believe that a defendant who is found NGI will be released immediately.(168) The Court, however, found Shannon's final argument to be irrelevant because the jury is instructed to disregard the consequences of its verdict when applying the law to the facts and that "`punishment . . . should not enter [its] consideration.'"(169) Furthermore, the Court noted, a juror is unfamiliar with many aspects of a criminal proceeding,(170) not merely the consequences of an NGI verdict.(171) No instructions regarding these other aspects are given, and the Court found no compelling reason why a special instruction should be required in the case of an NGI verdict.(172)
Based on the foregoing reasons, the United States Supreme Court held that a federal district judge was not required to instruct the jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict.(173) The Court conceded, however, that under limited circumstances, some form of instruction may be necessary.(174) No such circumstances were presented in Shannon.(175)
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens, in his dissent joined by Justice Blackmun, opined that the jury should be informed of the consequences of an NGI verdict.(176) The dissent endorsed the Lyles opinion,(177) holding that "`the jury has a right to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts.'"(178) While recognizing that a jury has no sentencing function, the dissent agreed with Lyles in that this concern "`[did] not apply in the problem before [the Court].'"(179) The dissent agreed with the majority that, prior to the enactment of the IDRA, it was appropriate for the federal judge to adhere to the traditional principle that a jury should not consider the consequences of its verdict and should instruct the jury to base its decision on the evidence only.(180) However, this traditional principle was appropriate because there was no federal statute authorizing commitment for insanity acquittees except in the District of Columbia,(181) and, in those courts, an instruction informing the jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict would have tended to increase the risk of improper convictions.(182)
According to the dissent, once the IDRA was enacted, and a federal civil commitment procedure was adopted, the Lyles holding should have become applicable to all federal courts.(183) Furthermore, the dissent disagreed with the majority's rationale that the legislative history was not dispositive in stating that the Lyles opinion would thereafter be followed.(184) In fact, the dissent stated that, "[t]he Act's legislative history unmistakably demonstrate[d] that the Lyles precedent would thereafter be followed nationwide."(185) Justice Stevens objected to the majority's decision not to endorse the Lyles opinion and follow it as precedent when the legislature had obviously endorsed it when drafting the IDRA.(186) Rather than establishing a general rule regarding whether or not the jury should be informed, Justice Stevens argued that "[a] far wiser disposition would allow the defendant to choose between the two rules, rather than tilt the scales to favor the prosecutor in every case."(187)
The dissent also pointed out that the majority's reliance on Rogers v. United States(188) was misplaced.(189) Instead of supporting the majority's position, the case actually was more illustrative of how juries are concerned "about the actual consequences of their verdicts."(190) The dissent argued that the proper holding in Rogers was that the guilty verdict had to be set aside, not simply because the judge failed to admonish the jury not to consider the consequences of its verdict, but because the court had violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 by responding to an inquiry from the jury without notifying defense counsel.(191) Furthermore, the Rogers Court considered the trial judge's response misleading because the judge had failed to advise the jury that the recommendation of mercy would not necessarily be given effect.(192) In this context, failure to admonish the jury that the consequences of the verdict should be irrelevant in its fact-finding duties was prejudicial to the defendant.(193) Hence "[w]hen there is a realistic danger that jurors' deliberations may be distorted by an incorrect assumption about those consequences, elementary notions of fairness demand that a clarifying instruction be given."(194) The dissent suggested that the Court should not simply focus on the traditional rule against informing the jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict,(195) but instead should consider the seriousness of the harm that could result from the refusal of such an instruction, especially in the absence of any countervailing harm that would result from giving the instruction.(196)
Justice Stevens further supported his position by noting that the American Bar Association,(197) as well as an increasing number of states which have considered this issue, has endorsed the use of the standard.(198) Quite simply, Justice Stevens felt that "`[t]here is no reason to keep this information from the jurors and every reason to make them aware of it.'"(199)
Analysis
A. Jurors' Lack of Knowledge Leads to Increased Risk of Mistake
As a matter of common knowledge, most people know that a defendant found guilty goes to jail and that a defendant found not guilty goes free.(200) However, what happens to a defendant found NGI is not a matter of common knowledge.(201) Therefore, as Shannon argued to the Court, an instruction informing the jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict would simply be giving jurors as much knowledge as they already have in any other case.(202) Although the jurors may be instructed, and specifically admonished, not to consider what the ultimate sentence will be, the average juror may still consider the consequences of the verdict.(203) The juror's lack of knowledge may cause him or her to guess, assume, and speculate as to what becomes of the defendant found NGI.(204) In so doing, the risk of mistake is clearly increased and the jury is distracted from its fact-finding duty.(205) Ironically, the risk of distracting the jury from its fact-finding duty is precisely the type of harm that courts have sought to prevent in their refusal to give an instruction.(206)
Without the benefit of an instruction informing the jurors as to the consequences of an NGI verdict, the risk of mistake creates a strong likelihood of prejudice to the defendant.(207) For example, if a juror concludes that the defendant was insane yet deserves punishment, the juror may find the defendant guilty simply to ensure commitment.(208) The concurring opinion in Lyles stated that "[t]he false assumption that acquittal by reason of insanity, like outright acquittal, frees the accused to walk out on the streets may lead juries to convict despite strong evidence of insanity."(209)
Concern over the jury considering the ultimate outcome of its decision was one reason why courts have held that instructions as to the consequences of an NGI verdict are not required.(210) A second reason given by the majority of courts for the rejection of such an instruction was that, with the exception of the District of Columbia, there was not a clear and distinct federal commitment procedure.(211) As a result, it was reasonable for a juror to fear that if the defendant were found NGI, he or she would still walk free, rather than be committed to a mental institution.(212) Once the IDRA was enacted, however, this fear was eliminated by mandating a period of commitment.(213) While alleviating the chance that an NGI defendant would walk out of the court a free person, there was still the risk that the average juror would not be aware of this newly-enacted commitment procedure provided for by the IDRA.(214) The court in Neavill had this risk in mind when it held that the jurors should be informed of the consequences of the NGI verdict, thus avoiding any possible risk of mistake.(215) Therefore, it would appear that the passage of the IDRA eliminated the rationale that the majority of the courts relied upon in their refusal to give an instruction: namely, that an instruction to the jury may cause it to convict the defendant in order to ensure commitment.(216) Nevertheless, this factor appeared to be irrelevant to the majority of courts which considered this issue, including the majority of the Shannon Court.(217)
Shannon argued to the Court that there was no authority that suggested that Congress was constitutionally forbidden to grant the jury a role in sentencing if it elected to do so.(218) Moreover, Shannon argued that giving the jury an instruction as to what would happen to the defendant found NGI does not give the jury any role tantamount to the sentencing function.(219) Rather, the instruction gives the jury information about the NGI verdict that it already knows about the guilty and not guilty verdicts.(220)
In support of this proposition, Shannon relied on United States v. Blume.(221) The Blume court held that the decision by the trial judge not to give an instruction was harmless error and did not require reversal of the defendant's conviction.(222) However, the three-member panel was divided three ways in its opinion.(223) As explained by Judge Newman, Judge Winter believed that such an instruction should normally not be given.(224) Judge Lumbard believed that the decision should be left to the trial judge.(225) Finally, Judge Newman believed that an instruction should always be given, unless the defendant prefers its omission.(226) Judge Newman went on to state that he believed that a brief sentence to the jury explaining the consequences of an NGI verdict "would minimize the likelihood of an unjust conviction by a jury seeking only to avoid the release of a potentially dangerous mental patient."(227)
[C]ommunicating the consequence of an NGI verdict guards against the risk that jurors, persuaded that a defendant has established an insanity defense, might nonetheless return a guilty verdict because they do not want the defendant to remain at large in the community. It may well have made sense before 1984 to protect the defendant from the risk of an undeserved guilty verdict by keeping the jurors ignorant of the fact that a successful insanity defense would result in the defendant's release from federal custody. It makes no sense now to expose the defendant to the risk of an undeserved guilty verdict by keeping the jurors ignorant of the fact that a successful insanity defense would result in his confinement.(228)
Furthermore, Judge Newman believed, based on the Senate Committee Report, that the intent of Congress in enacting the IDRA was to adopt the practice in the District of Columbia of granting the instruction whenever requested by the defendant.(229) Shannon, similarly, made this argument to the Court.(230)
B. By Adopting the District of Columbia Code as Its Model, Congress Incorporated the Holding of Lyles v. United States into the IDRA
Shannon argued that by adopting section 24-301 of the District of Columbia Code as its model, Congress implicitly incorporated the authoritative construction of Lyles into the IDRA.(231) It is a familiar canon of interpretation that when Congress borrows a provision from a state's statute, which has in that state a "known and settled construction," Congress is deemed to have adopted the state statute's provision as well as its judicial construction.(232)
The majority, however, held that this canon of interpretation is not dispositive, but rather a "mere[] . . . `presumption of legislative intention' to be invoked only `under suitable conditions.'"(233) In the present situation, the Court felt the "conditions" were "not suitable" because, when Congress developed the language of the IDRA, it significantly departed from the language and substance of the District of Columbia Code.(234) In fact, the majority noted that the canon of statutory interpretation--stemming from the notion that "court[s], in interpreting `borrowed' statutory language, should apply the same construction to the language that was placed upon it by the courts in the jurisdiction from which it was borrowed"--does not even apply to the Shannon case.(235) Rather, the majority believed that the Lyles court did not purport to construe the language of District of Columbia Code section 24-301, but instead relied on its supervisory power over the federal district courts in holding that the jury "should be informed of the consequences of an NGI verdict."(236) Therefore, the Court concluded that the canon was inapplicable because there was a lack of a "`known and settled construction'" that Congress could have adopted from the District of Columbia statute.(237)
C. Role of Legislative History
There are differing views among the courts regarding the role that legislative history plays in interpreting statutes.(238) The majority admits to a lack of awareness of any case in which the Court has given "authoritative weight to a single passage of legislative history that is in no way anchored in the text of the statute."(239) By giving the legislative history weight, the majority believed the Court would have to abandon the general guide in statute interpretation--the text of the statute.(240) It has generally been held that "courts have no authority to enforce alleged principles gleaned solely from legislative history that has no statutory reference point."(241) However, it has also been held that when a statute does not answer a particular question, the court may look to the legislative history to see if it can determine Congress's intent in the question.(242) The majority and dissent seemed to have struggled with this problem.(243) The general rule is that only in the face of ambiguity may the courts turn to legislative history.(244) The same rule appears to apply when the statute is silent on an issue.(245) Nevertheless, the majority held that, because there was nothing anchored in the statute, and because the Senate report did not purport to interpret any provision of the IDRA, the history was entitled to no weight.(246)
While the dissent agreed with the majority's assumption that Lyles would thereafter be followed does not have the force of a statutory mandate, the dissent noted that legislators believed the Lyles precedent to be "entirely sound."(247) The Supreme Court had previously held that "[c]ourts should construe laws in harmony with the legislative intent and seek to carry out legislative purpose."(248) The dissent was "startled" that the majority gave the legislative history no weight, "particularly when [it] . . . [did] for no reason other than a perceived inconsistency with another rule that is generally protective of defendant's rights [the rule against informing jurors as to the consequences of an NGI verdict]."(249) At the very least, in face of this uncertainty regarding the weight to be given to legislative history, the dissent contended that a wiser decision would have been to leave the choice to "the defendant to choose between the two rules, rather than tilt[ing] the scales to favor the prosecutor in every case."(250)
Conclusion
The Court in Shannon v. United States finally resolved the unsettled area of law as to whether a federal district judge was required to instruct the jury regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict whenever requested by the defendant.(251) While the decision that such an instruction is not required by the judge follows what the majority of courts have held,(252) it seems to ignore that the only thing the instruction does is give the jurors knowledge that they already have regarding the other two verdicts of guilty and not guilty. Moreover, although the IDRA does not address this issue in the text of the statute, the legislative history could not be more clear that Congress's intent was that such an instruction should be given whenever the defendant requests.(253) Therefore, it would seem that the better solution would be to leave the decision to the defendant:(254) if the defendant requests the instruction, it should be given, and if the defendant does not, then no instruction should be required.
Nicole M. Miles*
1. Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994).
3. United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1990), appeal after remand, 948 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1991), and cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992); United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Portis, 542 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1974); Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1966); Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965); Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 943 (1960), and cert. denied, 368 U.S. 992 (1962).
4. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2424.
5. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 17, 4241-4248 (1994).
6. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2425-26.
7. Id. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 32-72 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 86-112 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 126-72 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 173-96 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 197-247 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
19. United States v. Stanberry, 963 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that facts relevant to guilt or innocence are for jury to decide and facts relevant to sentencing are for court to decide); United States v. Broxton, 926 F.2d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that jury's sole function is to ascertain guilt or innocence, not to fix punishment), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991); see also Joseph P. Liu, Comment, Federal Jury Instructions and the Consequences of a Successful Insanity Defense, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1223, 1225-26 (1993).
20. Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1226.
21. Id.; Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1994).
22. Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1985). "Historically, the duty of imposing sentences has been vested in the trial judges because they have the best opportunity to make first-hand observations of the defendant to assess his character and habits and determine his prognosis for rehabilitation . . . ." Id. at 662. Against these factors, the judge may weigh the particular facts of the crime and defendant's prior criminal conduct, and thereafter impose an appropriate sentence. Id.; see also Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1226.
23. Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1226. "`It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.'" Id. (quoting Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 657, 664 (1873)).
24. See United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1384 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that jury is obligated to reach its verdict without regard to sentence); United States v. Sheffer, 700 F. Supp. 292, 293 (D. Md. 1988) ("The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to a jury's determination of guilt and innocence, not punishment." (citing United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 908-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1089 (1984))).
25. Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1962) ("Unless otherwise provided . . . it is the duty of the court to impose sentence, or make such other disposition of the case as required by law, after the facts have been decided by the jury."), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965); see also Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Instructions in State Criminal Case in Which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital Confinement in Event of Acquittal, 81 A.L.R.4th 659, 666 (1990) ("In a criminal case, the punishment or other disposition of the defendant following the jury's verdict on guilt or innocence is ordinarily a matter for the court's determination absent a contrary statute." (footnote omitted)).
26. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2424.
27. See Miller v. United States, 37 App. D.C. 138, 143 (1911); see also United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Davidson, 367 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1966); Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965).
28. Fleming, Annotation, supra note 25, at 666; see also Greer, 620 F.2d at 1384 ("[A]uthorities are unequivocal in holding that presenting information to the jury about . . . sentencing is prejudicial.").
29. See Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1227. "The punishment provided by law for the offense charged in the indictment is a matter exclusively within the province of the Court and should never be considered by the jury in any way in arriving at an impartial verdict as to the offense charged." Id. (citing 1 Edward J. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 20.01, at 822 (4th ed. 1992)); see also Ferra, 900 F.2d at 1061 (holding that judge's instruction to jurors that "they are judges of the facts and that the ultimate decision on points of law lies elsewhere," was proper, and in fact focuses jurors on their true responsibilities).
30. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975) (holding that jury should be admonished to reach its verdict without regard to the possible sentence); Pope, 298 F.2d at 508 (holding that information regarding sentence tends to draw jurors' attention away from chief function as sole judges of facts).
31. See United States v. Portis, 542 F.2d 414, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1047-48 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 900-01 (10th Cir. 1972); Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534, 546-47 (9th Cir. 1966); Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965).
32. See cases cited supra note 31.
33. See McCracken, 488 F.2d at 418 (noting that the only proper verdicts in the federal criminal practice are "guilty" and "not guilty"); Evalt, 359 F.2d at 537 (holding that a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is encompassed within the plea of "not guilty").
34. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3423 [hereinafter 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.]. In the legislative history of the IDRA, Congress noted that prior to the IDRA, there was no federal procedure for commitment to a mental hospital of a defendant acquitted by NGI. Id. "Federal officials can obtain civil commitment of such persons only by urging local authorities to institute such proceedings." Id.
35. Shannon v. United States 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (1994); see also Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1228 & n.24. "[S]uch efforts [of civil commitment by local authorities] are rarely successful due largely to a lack of sufficient contacts between the acquitted defendant and the individual State for the [state] to be willing to undertake responsibility of him." 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 34, at 3423.
36. McCracken, 488 F.2d at 409. The McCracken court stated the following:
The defendant's sanity is always an element of the offense charged. When no question of insanity is raised, the Government's burden of proving sanity is satisfied by the so-called "presumption of sanity," which stands in the place of evidence. When, however, "some" evidence is received, establishing the hypothesis of insanity, the burden is on the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense.Id. (citing Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1969); Brock v. United States, 387 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1967); Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 140 (5th Cir. 1967)); see also 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 34, at 3406; Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1228 (citing Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484 (1895); Henry T. Miller, Comment, Recent Changes in the Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity Defense, 46 La. L. Rev. 337, 353-54 (1985)).
37. Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1228-29; see also Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d at 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1962).
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
39. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2422.
40. Id. at 2422-23 (citing McCracken, 488 F.2d at 423; United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 900-01 (10th Cir. 1972); Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534, 546 (9th Cir. 1966)).
41. Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965). For a discussion of Pope, see infra part II.B.1.
42. United States v. Portis, 542 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of Portis, see infra part II.B.2.
43. Pope v. United States 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965). The defendant was convicted of robbery of a state bank and putting the life of a person in jeopardy through the use of a dangerous weapon. Id. at 507. At trial the defendant relied on the insanity defense. Id.
44. Id. at 508. The defendants requested the following instruction:
If a defendant is found not guilty on the ground of insanity, it then becomes the duty of the Court to commit him to St. Elizabeths Hospital, and this the Court would do. The defendant then would remain at St. Elizabeths Hospital until he is cured and it is deemed safe to release him; and when that time arrives he will be released and will suffer no further consequences from this offense.Id.
52. United States v. Portis, 542 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1976).
53. Defendants requested the following instruction:
If you acquit the defendant, it would be presumed that his state of insanity continues and it would be the responsibility of the government to determine the disposition to be made of him. Questions concerning such disposition, like questions relating to punishment in the event of conviction, are matters that should not be given any consideration by the jury.Id. at 420.
59. Id. at 421 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1077 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975)).
61. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 943 (1960), and cert. denied, 368 U.S. 992 (1962).
64. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (1951) (current version at D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (1989)).
66. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (d)(1) (1981) states the following:
If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant to this subsection . . . .Id.
72. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (1988)).
73. See Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994); United States v. Fisher, 10 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2746 (1994); United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2746 (1994); United States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 932 (1992); United States v. Neavill, 868 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir.), vacated upon grant of reh'g en banc, 877 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir.), and appeal dismissed at defendant's request, 886 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
74. See United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
75. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (1988)).
76. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988); Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2423.
77. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 4242(b) (1988).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(c) (1988).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (1988).
[A] person found not guilty only by reason of insanity of an offense involving bodily injury to, or serious damage to the property of, another person, or involving a substantial risk of such injury or damage, has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that his release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage of property of another due to a present mental disease or defect. With respect to any other offense, the person has the burden of such proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (1988).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d)-(e) (1988).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f) (1988).
85. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 34, at 3422 (footnotes omitted); see also Instruction 5.11 of the Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia (1972), which states the following:
If the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, it becomes the duty of the court to commit him to St. Elizabeths Hospital. There will be a hearing within 50 days to determine whether the defendant will remain in custody, and will be entitled to release from custody only if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not likely to injure himself or other persons due to mental illness.Id., quoted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 34, at 3422.
86. See Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994); United States v. Fisher, 10 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2746 (1994); United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2746 (1994); United States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 932 (1992); United States v. Neavill, 868 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir.), vacated upon grant of reh'g en banc, 877 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir.), and appeal dismissed at defendant's request, 886 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
87. United States v. Neavill, 868 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1989).
88. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 731 (8th Cir. 1967) (rejecting the Lyles rationale: "[We] see no reason why we should depart from the long-established principle that, in the absence of some specific statutory provision, a defendant's disposition is not a matter for the jury's concern."), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968), and cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971); see also supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
89. Neavill, 868 F.2d at 1004-05.
90. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding that discussing instruction regarding consequences of NGI verdict was proper), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 943 (1960), and cert. denied, 368 U.S. 992 (1962).
91. Neavill, 868 F.2d at 1002.
95. Id. at 1004 (alteration in original) (quoting 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 34, at 3422).
96. Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1239 (citing Neavill, 868 F.2d at 1004).
97. Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (1994).
98. United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2746 (1994).
101. Id. at 1576-77. "The Committee endorses the procedure used in the District of Columbia . . . ." Id. at 1576 (quoting 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 34, at 3422).
102. Thigpen, 4 F.3d at 1577; see also Alacare Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 850, 856 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that court should look at statute's legislative history if only the statute is ambiguous).
103. Thigpen, 4 F.3d at 1577; see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he cardinal principle of judicial function of statutory interpretation is that courts have no authority to enforce principles gleaned solely from legislative history that have no statutory reference.").
104. Thigpen, 4 F.3d at 1577; see also Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965).
107. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992).
111. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 34, at 3422).
113. Compare United States v. Neavill, 868 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding instruction proper) with United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding instruction improper), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2746 (1994) and United States v. Blume 967 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that giving instruction left to discretion of trial judge).
114. Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994).
119. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2423.
120. Id. (first alteration in original) (omission in original) (quoting the jury instruction given by the district court judge).
121. Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994) (No. 92-8346).
124. United States v. Shannon, 981 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 380 (1993), and aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994).
127. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2424.
128. See id. at 2422. The seven-justice majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Blackmun. Id.
129. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2422.
134. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2424 (citing Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965)); see also supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
135. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975).
136. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2424 (footnote omitted) (citing Rogers, 422 U.S. at 40).
139. Id. at 40. Generally, a recommendation for leniency by a jury does not affect the validity of the verdict and the trial judge may simply disregard it. Id.; see also Cook v. United States, 379 F.2d 966, 970 (5th Cir. 1967).
140. Rogers, 422 U.S. at 40 (citations omitted).
141. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2424.
143. Id.; see also supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
144. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2424-25.
145. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
146. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2425; see also D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (1989). This section of the Code provided for commitment of insane criminals during trial; restoration to competency; acquittal by reason of insanity; release after confinement; expenses of confinement; inconsistent statutes superseded; escaped persons; insanity defense; and motions for relief. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (1989).
147. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 943 (1960), and cert. denied, 368 U.S. 992 (1962).
148. Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
149. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2425 (quoting Carolene, 323 U.S. at 26).
150. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
151. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2425 (quoting Capital Traction, 174 U.S. at 36).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (1988).
154. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301(j) (1989).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(c) (1988).
156. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301(d)(2)(a) (1989).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (1988).
158. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301(k)(3) (1989).
159. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2425-26 (footnote omitted).
160. Id. at 2426 n.7 (citing United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973-95 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
161. Id. at 2426 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988)).
163. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
164. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2426.
169. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2427 (omission in original). The Court realized that it is a difficult task for a juror to not consider the consequences of the verdict; however, this task arises in every case, not just in NGI cases. Id. The Court made an analogy to a case in which the State fails to meet its burden. Id. The judicial system presumes that the jury will find the defendant not guilty, rather than guilty, "even if [it] is convinced the defendant is highly dangerous and should be incarcerated." Id.
170. The Court gave examples such as mandatory minimum or maximum sentences, probation, parole, or the sentencing range for lesser included offenses. Id. at 2428; see also United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2746 (1994). Because jurors may not understand these sentencing options either, the Court noted that district courts would be obligated to instruct juries as to the consequences of all these options as well. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2428. Therefore, the general rule against informing juries as to the consequences of their verdicts would "be swallowed by the exceptions." Id.
171. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2428.
174. Id. For example, if a witness or attorney, in the hearing of the jury, says that the defendant would "go free" if found NGI, an instruction would be necessary to repair this misstatement. Id.
176. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2431 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
178. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 943 (1960), and cert. denied, 368 U.S. 992 (1962)).
179. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lyles, 254 F.2d at 728).
180. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
182. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The rule against instructing the jury was to protect the defendant from undue prejudice of the jury "rely[ing] on matters such as sympathy for the victim, arguments of counsel, or inadmissible comments in the courtroom." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
186. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The legislative history states that the Lyles decision was endorsed by Congress. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
187. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975); see also supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
189. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
192. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2431 n.4; see also ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards § 7-6.8 (1989) (recommending that judges give the instruction).
198. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2431 & n.3; see also People v. Young, 234 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Ct. App. 1987); People v. Thompson, 591 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1979); Roberts v. State, 335 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1976); State v. Babin, 319 So. 2d 367 (La. 1975); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 323 N.E.2d 294 (1975); Erdman v. State, 553 A.2d 244 (Md. 1989); Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 380 A.2d 349 (Pa. 1977); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988).
199. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2431 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., concurring)).
200. Id. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. Brief for Petitioner at 17, Shannon (No. 92-8346) (citing Lyles, 254 F.2d 725; Blume, 967 F.2d 45 (Newman, J., concurring)).
203. Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1223 (citing Henry Weihofen, Procedure for Determining Defendant's Mental Condition Under the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 29 Temp. L.Q. 235, 247 (1956)).
204. Id. at 1235; see also United States v. Neavill, 868 F.2d 1000, 1002 (8th Cir.), vacated upon grant of reh'g en banc, 877 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed at defendant's request, 886 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
205. Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1242.
207. Id. at 1242 ("When a jury mistakenly believes that a defendant will be released if found NGI, it may be persuaded to find the defendant guilty in order to ensure that the defendant remain incarcerated.").
208. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2429; see also Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1242. But see United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.) (holding that refusal of instruction was proper), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 932 (1992).
210. Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1235-37.
211. Id. at 1232; see also D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (1989).
213. See generally supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
214. United States v. Neavill, 868 F.2d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated upon grant of reh'g en banc, 877 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir.), and appeal dismissed at defendant's request, 886 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
215. Neavill, 868 F.2d at 1004; see also supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
216. Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1240.
217. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2427; see also Liu, Comment, supra note 19, at 1240-42. In fact, the court in Frank still held that informing jurors as to the consequences of an NGI verdict would result from the jury departing from its duty as finder of fact. United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 878-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 932 (1992).
218. Brief for the Petitioner at 12, Shannon (No. 92-8346) (citing Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 723, 781-93 (1993)).
219. Brief for the Petitioner at 17, Shannon (No. 92-8346).
221. United States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45 (2nd Cir. 1992); see also supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
223. Id. at 50. The panel consisted of Judges Winter, Lumbard, and Newman. Id.
224. Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
225. Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
226. Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
227. Brief for the Petitioner at 16, Shannon (No. 92-8346) (citing Blume, 967 F.2d at 52 (Newman, J., concurring)).
228. Blume, 967 F.2d at 52 (Newman, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
229. Brief for the Petitioner at 16, Shannon (No. 92-8346); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
230. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2425-26; see also Brief for the Petitioner at 21, Shannon (No. 92-8346).
231. Brief for the Petitioner at 18-22, Shannon (No. 92-8346); see also United States v. Crutchfield, 893 F.2d 376, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[T]he Senate Report makes clear that Congress had the D.C.Code [sic] in mind when it passed the IDRA.").
232. Brief for the Petitioner at 19-20, Shannon (No. 92-8346) (emphasis added); see also Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 36 (1899).
233. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2425 (quoting Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944)).
234. Id. For discussion of these significant differences, see supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
235. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2426 n.8.
237. Id. (quoting Capital Traction, 174 U.S. at 36).
238. Id. (citing Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 182 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
240. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2426.
241. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted).
242. See Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbldg. Corp. v. Sowell, 933 F.2d 1561, 1567 (11th Cir.) ("Because the statute does not explicitly answer the question, we will look to legislative history to see if we can determine Congress' intent . . . ."), reh'g denied, 945 F.2d 415 (1991); see also Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1989).
243. Compare Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2426 (noting that legislative history entitled to no weight) with id. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Act's legislative history demonstrates that Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975), would be followed).
244. United States v. Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1990); Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 1987).
245. See Mitson v. AG Eng'g & Dev. Co., 835 F. Supp. 572 (D. Colo. 1993) (noting that if statute is silent with regard to a certain issue, court should turn to legislative intent); Watters v. Pelican Int'l, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1452 (D. Colo. 1989) (noting that if statute is silent, question of interpretation should be answered by legislative intent).
246. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2426. But see United States v. Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402, 1411 n.18 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that although courts are generally reluctant to place great weight upon legislative history, it is appropriate to consult such materials where the statutory element is not merely ambiguous, but is completely absent).
247. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Foster v. United States, 303 U.S. 118, 120 (1938); see also United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 239 (1927) (noting that "intention of Congress is an all important factor" in the interpretation of statutes enacted by it).
249. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
254. See generally supra part IV.
* To my mother for her understanding and unending support; to my grandmother for her love and caring; and to my grandfather, in loving memory.