Taiwan: It Looks Like It, It Acts Like It, But Is It a State? The Ability to Achieve a Dream Through Membership in International Organizations
Mark S. Zaid*
Introduction
It has been nearly fifty years since the Chinese Communist-backed government ousted its democratic opponents from mainland China and forced them to flee to the neighboring island of Taiwan. Since 1949, the citizens of the Republic of China (ROC), also known as Taiwan, have lived with the wishful hope that one day, should the right conditions come to exist, unity with the People's Republic of China (PRC) will manifest itself as a reality. Yet, until that day arrives, the ROC faces a daily struggle now over twenty-five years old that has emerged as an international quagmire sometimes threatening to bring the world to the brink of war--the legal status of the island nation.
That threat is the question itself. Is Taiwan an independent nation qualified for statehood under international law? Or is it something less than a state? From 1945 to 1971, the ROC held a seat on the United Nation's Security Council as the permanent and sole representative of the government of China. International politics, however, led by the passage of General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971, caused its removal and replacement by the government of the PRC.(1) Since that day,
Taiwan has struggled to gain, or more appropriately recover, the international recognition it had once enjoyed.
As a strict matter of international law, there is little dispute that Taiwan meets the requirements for statehood and the rights that can be enjoyed therefrom.(2) However, because of the overwhelming power of the PRC, the ROC's attempts to obtain official international status still remain outside of its grasp. Yet, there are alternatives that Taiwan can follow that will, at the very least, symbolize an equivalent victory and perhaps lead the ROC down the path towards eventual international recognition and statehood. By focusing attention on membership in international organizations, Taiwan can implicitly, if not explicitly, attain the independence it seeks.
Like Pinocchio, the little wooden boy of Walt Disney's imagination, who more than anything dreamed of becoming a real live boy, or, the modern story version symbolized by Data, an android made famous by Star Trek: The Next Generation television series, who, though possessive of superhuman abilities and intellect, lacked human qualities he believed were more important, Taiwan dreams of achieving what it seemed by appearance to already have--the ability to function as an independent state. Notwithstanding the legal basis underlying Taiwan's arguments for statehood, the political reality is that recognition as a state is not forthcoming in the distant future. Perception of statehood, however, is another matter, and is a goal readily attainable.
This Article briefly explores the difficulties faced by Taiwan in gaining international recognition, how the posture of the PRC has politically harmed the ROC worldwide, and suggests, given the reality of the situation, a policy for Taiwan to follow that may eventually lead it to its objective of attaining international statehood.
The Economic Facts Demonstrate Taiwan's Unique Strength
In today's world, a nation's strength is no longer measured solely by the number of ships in its fleet or troops on active duty. It is demonstrated by the viability and mobility of the nation's economy. On this ground, Taiwan is a power to be reckoned with on a global scale. While it might not be a "state" in the international legal arena, it certainly is on the financial playing field.
Consider some of the facts. Taiwan, if it were a "state," would have or be the:
Twentieth largest gross domestic product;(3)
Fourteenth largest trading nation in the world;(4)
Seventh largest foreign investor;(5)
Seventh largest trading partner of the United States;(6)
Third largest foreign exchange reserve.(7)
These statistics paint an impressive picture, considering the legal status that is attributed to this small island of only 21.5 million people.(8) Yet, Taiwan's economic power base is still no match for the political influence asserted by mainland China. Indeed, while its economic position is secure, its legal "status" in the international arena remains ambivalent.
Taiwan's Seemingly Blurred Policy on Independent Statehood
Part of the problem has been the blurred positions staked out by Taiwan's government in support of its goals. Is it seeking to retake its original United Nations (UN) seat and oust the PRC as the "true" China, or join the UN as an independent state separate from that of the PRC? Does it wish to become an independent state or seek reunification with the PRC?
Originally, the position for most of the last twenty-five years has been to retake its rightful place as "the" China in the UN. Recently, however, Taiwan has sought to stake out a position separate and distinct from that of China. It has indicated that "[i]t has no intention of challenging the PRC's seat in the UN."(9) Instead, Taiwan now emphasizes that it "believes that parallel participation in the UN and other international organizations would be conducive to the reunification of China because it would promote dialogue and facilitate negotiation between parties on an equal footing."(10) Nevertheless, the problem continues, notwithstanding this modified position, however, based on the
ROC's adoption of a "one China, two governments" policy.(11) This posture is still viewed as a threat by mainland China.(12)
Adding to the debate is the promotion by Taiwanese officials of the hopeful eventual reunification with China which is losing popularity.(13) Growing concern exists based on the recent success of the main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which explicitly advocates Taiwanese independence as "Taiwan"--an entirely separate state from that of the PRC. DPP leaders continue to push for a national referendum to test their resolve.(14) Taiwan's recent local elections at the end of 1997 demonstrated the DPP's growing presence when it emerged with the greatest number of votes.(15) This has necessitated Taiwan's primary political party to attempt to publicly maintain a similar attitude. Vice President Lien Chan has, for example, "described Taiwan as `a sovereign state of 21 million people.'"(16) Unfortunately, oftentimes these positions cross paths, and the results are detrimental to attaining Taiwan's ultimate objective in the short term.
The Political Reality Faced By Taiwan Precludes Formal Independence or Statehood
Since 1971, Taiwan has sought to devise a strategy to repeal UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which effectively ejected Taiwan from the China seat in place of the PRC.(17) To date none have been successful.(18)
In 1997, for the fifth straight year, Taiwan failed at its active bid to persuade the UN's General Assembly to consider re-admitting Taiwan to the UN. Nine small states had requested the steering committee to
place the re-admission issue on the General Assembly's agenda.(19) After nearly a three hour debate, the chairman of the committee ruled that the proposal would not be placed on the agenda for lack of consensus.(20) Fifteen countries spoke in favor of consideration, while thirty-one nations opposed inclusion of the issue on the agenda.(21) China's opposition again proved far too strong.
In fact, in 1997, the PRC gained an entrenched foothold against Taiwan by convincing several states to sever formal diplomatic relations with the ROC. In September 1997, China convinced the island of St. Lucia in the Lesser Antilles to switch its allegiance.(22) In this case, U.S. $1 million in aid from China proved to be Taiwan's undoing.(23) Earlier in May, a U.S. $114 million joint venture with China persuaded the Bahamas to recognize the PRC instead of the ROC.(24) Powerful states such as South Africa were to follow this course of action by the end of the year.(25)
As a result, Taiwan now maintains diplomatic relations with only about 30 nations, while China boasts about 160.(26) "However, while Taiwan is losing its smallest friends to the highest bidder it is actually making discreet but more substantive diplomatic progress with the bigger nations. European countries, including Britain, which do not recognise Taiwan, have nevertheless upgraded the level of their semi-official diplomatic representation."(27) Nevertheless, this give-and-take battle is merely a distraction from a more available path of action that likely boasts a better chance of success over the short term.
Taiwan's Membership In International Organizations Remains An Important Asset
Given the stern and hostile opposition of China to allow even a discussion of Taiwan's re-admission to the UN, an alternative strategy needs to be devised and implemented. Membership in international organizations may serve as the road to Mecca for Taiwan, at least in the short term.
Taiwan already strives to play a role in the international community through membership in international organizations, participation in international conferences, and promoting itself wherever possible as if it were an independent state.(28) It maintains, for example, membership in the Asian Development Bank and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and sits as an observer at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Presently, Taiwan is seeking admission in the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Monetary Fund, the International Telecommunications Union, the International Maritime Organization, and full membership in the WTO.
Of course, membership in these organizations is not based on statehood or it would otherwise be fervently opposed by China. As it is, China continues to make life difficult for the government of Taiwan by impeding the ROC's attempts to participate in the international arena.(29) For example, China successfully blocked the issuance of visas to representatives of Taiwan, precluding their participation in the 1996 Beijing Women's Conference.(30) Neither were Taiwanese representatives permitted to attend the WHO's 1996 Annual Meeting.(31)
Pressure from China to impede Taiwanese progress extends further than to just acts to be undertaken by Taiwan itself. A high level meeting of the WTO held in October 1997 found itself without a UN sponsor because of Chinese opposition. The UN Conference on Trade and Development was originally scheduled to co-host the meeting, but Chinese officials forced the UN agency to withdraw by arguing that UN participation would be viewed as de facto recognition of Taiwan.(32)
Attendance at an international conference in Panama in September 1997 also turned into a political battleground when China asserted significant pressure that convinced world leaders such as President Bill Clinton, and world organizations such as the UN, not to attend merely because Taiwan would be formally represented by its president.(33) In fact, China even forbade and blocked the UN from accepting humanitarian financial aid from Taiwan that was offered to help Rwandan refugees and the Turkish Kurds in the aftermath of the Iraqi inva-
sion.(34) Such involvement in UN activities, the PRC argues, would grant de facto recognition to the ROC.(35)
Although the lack of recognition as an independent state has cost Taiwan the ability to execute and ratify international accords, this has not stopped it from accepting its share of international responsibilities. "The ROC has, for instance, acted on its own initiative to abide by the provisions of the Montreal Protocol on the Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and adopted substantive coordinating measures to safeguard the interests of all humanity."(36) Given its economic power, Taiwan has an important role to play in the international arena. Through participation or membership in international organizations that do not require statehood, Taiwan can best exercise its independent authority yet carefully avoid formally declaring independence. At the same time, Taiwan's acceptance of international obligations as if it were a state will create a growing impression of independence.
United States' Policy Towards Taiwan Will Be A Key Factor
It is an acknowledged fact that Taiwan's immediate future in the UN and membership in international organizations depends, in large part on the support of the United States.(37) Present United States policy towards Taiwan, though clearly supportive, has been guarded at best.
The U.S. view, deferential to China, is that there is only one China, but that the two entities should resolve things peacefully. The United States is certainly opposed to China's forcing a solution, but
it also opposes any unilateral Taiwanese moves toward independence that China would view as provocative and unacceptable.(38)
In September 1994, the Clinton Administration conducted a policy review of the Taiwan question, particularly with respect to increased international participation by Taiwan. It concluded that "[f]or those international organizations without requirement for statehood, United States will support more actively for Taiwan to participate. . . . For those international organizations that require statehood, United States will look for ways for Taiwan to be heard."(39)
Congress has often attempted to play a role and stake out its position on the Taiwanese question. In late 1996, the United States Congress endorsed the July 18, 1996 declaration of the European Parliament which found "`that the people of Taiwan ought to be better represented in international organizations than they are at present, which would benefit both Taiwan and the whole of the international community.'"(40) Bills and resolutions concerning Taiwan are frequently introduced every year in Congress. The first session of the 105th Congress has been no exception. At least five separate resolutions were introduced including, but not limited to:
Senate Concurrent Resolution 15--"Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States support the accession of Taiwan to the World Trade Organization."(41)
Senate Concurrent Resolution 30--"Expressing the sense of Congress that the Republic of China on Taiwan should be admitted to multilateral economic institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development."(42)
House of Representatives Resolution 190--"Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Taiwan should be admitted to the World Trade Organization without making such admission conditional on the previous or simultaneous admission of the People's Republic of China to the WTO."(43)
House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution 132--"Relating to the Republic of China (Taiwan's) participation in the United Nations."(44)
House of Representatives Resolution 225--"Urging the President to make clear to the People's Republic of China the commitment of the American people to security and democracy on Taiwan."(45)
Recommendation for a New Taiwan Policy
The strength of current Chinese opposition to Taiwanese independence is far too great to overcome at this time. Seeking full membership at the UN will only serve to increase tension, the results of which will not be of benefit to anyone. Taiwan's strength, however, lies in its economic might and moral right to exist and operate as if an independent state. With this knowledge in hand, therefore, there is a way for Taiwan to steadily attain its objective of statehood while refraining from actually asserting independence, thereby avoiding Chinese retaliation.
A. Taiwan Should Assert and Emphasize its Sovereignty, Not Statehood
Recognition by other states is not an essential component of sovereignty, nor is UN recognition required. In fact, Taiwan should act and function more as a global corporation than as a state. By tacitly agreeing with China that Taiwan is not an independent state, Taiwan removes itself from liability or sanctions under respective international treaties and increases the likelihood of escaping a Chinese military response. At the same time, Taiwan should fundamentally and vocally assert its intentions to abide by all obligations imposed by those international treaties it would have consented to ratify were it a recognized independent state. Bilateral agreements or contracts should then be executed between Taiwan and other states to impose similar obligations and freely permit commercial and social intercourse between the two respective parties.(46)
B. Taiwan Should Join International Organizations that do not Require Statehood for Membership
Taiwan should increase its efforts to join as many international organizations as possible that do not require statehood as a membership criteria. Those that do require statehood as a prerequisite in order to participate in activities can, as set forth above, be the subject of bilateral agreements imposing the same or similar obligations and responsibilities. This strategy coincides with President Lee's adoption of "`more flexible strategies to build stronger ties with other countries and actively join activities of the United Nations and other world bodies to make constructive contributions to world peace, cooperation and prosperity.'"(47)
C. Taiwan Should Act Like a State
Taiwan should do everything in its power to exemplify the old saying of "if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck." If it acts like a state, talks like a state, and looks like a state, it will be a state. Yet, by not asserting itself as a state--or a duck--Taiwan will find itself less of a target during hunting season. Evidence of a similar tactic is already apparent. As one journalist recently observed, Taiwanese officials, though not likely to declare formal independence from China, "appear ready to push their cause right up to that final red line."(48)
VIII. Conclusion
By the end of Walt Disney's story, Pinocchio finally attains his dream of becoming a real human boy. So too does the Star Trek: The Next Generation android Data, by the utilization of an "emotion" computer chip, realize his goal of humanity. Taiwan one day will likely find that its dream will manifest itself once the appropriate political conditions exist. Until that day arrives, however, the illusion of statehood offers rewards that will help lead Taiwan to the eventual big payoff.
* J.D., Albany Law School; B.A., University of Rochester. Mr. Zaid, a Washington, D.C. attorney and lobbyist, specializes in matters of international criminal law, public international law, national security issues, and litigation under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts. The views expressed by Mr. Zaid are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization or entity with which he is or has been affiliated.
1. G.A. Res. 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8439 (1971), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 561 (1972); see also Hungdah Chiu, The Right of the Republic of China and Its 21 Million Chinese People to Participate in the United Nations, 28 J. Marshall L. Rev. 247, 252-53 (1994); Tzu-Wen Lee, The International Legal Status of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 351, 365-67 (1996).
2. A state, within the traditional definitions of international law, "has a defined territory and a permanent population, which is under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 201 (1987) (indicating that the territorial requirement is met even if rival claims over the same territory exist); see also Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, T.S. No. 881 (setting forth same four requirements for status as a state); James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 36 (1979) (referring to the Montevideo formula as the "basic criteria for statehood"); Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 13-14 (1963) ("A study of United Nations practice . . . will reveal a surprisingly close adherence to the traditional criteria of statehood" as articulated in the Montevideo Convention); 1 D. P. O'Connell, International Law 284 (2d ed. 1970). Taiwan clearly fits the well-settled definition of a state. It maintains a defined territory of 36,000 square kilometers and a population of 21.5 million people under the control of its own government for the majority of this century. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, Seeking a Way Out of an International Maze 1 (1997) [hereinafter International Maze] (on file with the New England Law Review). Indeed, in 1996, Taiwan witnessed the first democratic election in Chinese history. See id.
3. See Foreign Ministry Announces Renewed Bid for Taiwan to Rejoin UN, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
4. See International Maze, supra note 2, at 2.
5. See H.R. Res. 190, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Chiu, supra note 1, at 247.
6. See H.R. Res. 190, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Chiu, supra note 1, at 247.
7. See International Maze, supra note 2, at 2.
9. Id. at 4; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, The Necessity to Review the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758: The Position Paper on the Participation of the ROC on Taiwan in the UN 3 (1997) [hereinafter UN Necessity] (on file with the New England Law Review). Tapei's original position has been reevaluated in recent years and "Taipei has given up its claim of being the sole legitimate government of all China." Id. at 1.
10. International Maze, supra note 2, at 5. Part of the difficulty with this arg- ument is that divided states have generally been admitted to the UN only after conflicting claims have been formally resolved either in favor of division or reunification. For example, the two German states were admitted only after the conclusion of a treaty that clarified under international law that there were two German states, and that both states agreed to accept this formulation. See G.A. Res. 3050, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., 2117th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 30, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). More recently, however, there have been some departures from the UN's preference for agreement between divided states as a precondition to dual membership. Despite disagreement over whether reunification should take place, the UN, in 1990, admitted the two Koreas as separate members. See The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 166, 172 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994). Similarly, in 1992, the UN admitted Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia, notwithstanding the claim of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) that their secession from Yugoslavia was invalid. See Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the United Nations, 28 Cornell Int'l L.J. 54, 55 (1995).
11. See Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, Cross-Strait Relations: Past, Present and Future 4 (1997) [hereinafter Cross-Strait Relations] (on file with the New England Law Review). For example, during his address to the Eleventh Plenary Session of the National Unification Council on October 21, 1996, President Lee Teng-hui set forth a six-point policy that included pursuing unification and advocated to separately join international organizations. See id. at 33-34. These two policies may often times create conflicting interests.
12. The National Unification Council of Taiwan set forth its explanation of "`One China'" on August 1, 1992:
1. Both sides of the Taiwan Straits agree that there is only one China. However, the two sides of the Straits have different opinions as to the meaning of "one China." To Peking, "one China" means "the Peoples's Republic of China (PRC)," with Taiwan to become a "Special Administrative Region" after unification. Taipei on the other hand, considers "one China" to mean the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1912 and with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China as well.
2. Since 1949, China has been temporarily divided, and each side of the Taiwan Straits is administered by a separate political entity. This is an objective reality that no proposal for China's unification can overlook.
3. In February 1991, the government of the Republic of China, resolutely seeking to establish consensus and start the process of unification, adopted the "Guidelines for National Unification." This was done to enhance the progress and well-being of the people, and the prosperity of the nation. The ROC government sincerely hopes that the mainland authorities will adopt a pragmatic attitude, set aside prejudices, and cooperate in contributing its wisdom and energies toward the building of a free, democratic and prosperous China.Cross-Strait Relations, supra note 11, at 45-46.
13. The former policy was to assert that there was one China, but to disagree over which was the lawful government, that which resided on Taiwan or mainland China. See Don't Even Think About It, Economist, Feb. 3, 1996, at 13, 13. This policy has essentially been abandoned. See id. Nevertheless, the reunification goal remains an official policy of the ruling Kumintang party. President Lee Teng-hui has stated that "`[i]t is our ultimate goal to seek reunification of all China under freedom, democracy and prosperity on the principles of reason, peace and reciprocity.'" Hsin-hsin Yang, Taiwan President Pledges to Reunify With China, Agence France Presse, Aug. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quoting President Lee Teng-hui).
14. Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian, thought to be the probable DPP presidential candidate in 2000, has said that "his party's policy is to `establish a new and independent Republic of Taiwan.'" Don Oberdorfer, For the Chinese, the Main Issue Is Always Taiwan, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 1997, at C6 (quoting Mayor Chen Shui-bian). But cf. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., A Taiwan Deal, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1998, at C7 (declaring independence would provide only symbolic gains).
15. See Taiwan's Milestone, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1997, at A24.
16. Oberdorfer, supra note 14, at C6 (quoting Vice President Lien Chan).
17. See International Maze, supra note 2, at 2-3; see also G.A. Res. 2758, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. at 561.
18. See Benjamin Yeh, Taiwan Government Urged to Re-think UN Bid, Agence France Presse, Sept. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. For an analysis discussing the international, policy, and legal implications of Taiwan's membership in the UN, see Should Taiwan be Admitted to the United Nations?: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Sec., Int'l Org. and Human Rights of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs with the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific, 103d Cong. 87-102 (1994) (statement of Hungdah Chiu); UN Necessity, supra note 9; Parris Chang & Kok-ui Lim, Taiwan's Case for United Nations Membership, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 393, 424-30 (1996); Chiu, supra note 1, at 253-56; Lee, supra note 1, at 367-88. This year marked the first time that Taiwan directly challenged Resolution 2758, rather than merely seeking to obtain a seat within the UN. See Chris Van Minh, Calls for Equal Treatment Underline UN Bid By ROC, Free China Journal, Sept. 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
19. See Foreign Ministry Announces Renewed Bid for Taiwan to Rejoin UN, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
21. See Lilian Wu, ROC's UN Bid is Long-Term Goal: Acting Foreign Minister, Central News Agency, Sept. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. "The 15 countries that spoke [in favor of] the ROC were the Solomon Islands, Honduras, Senegal, Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Liberia, Nicaragua, Chad, Papua New Guinea, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi and El Salvador." Id. The thirty-one in opposition "were mainland China, Laos, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Nepal, Argentina, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the Bahamas, Mongolia, Columbia, Libya, Pakistan, Burma, Iran, Syria, Russia, Cuba, Italy, Egypt, Cyprus, Zambia, Brazil, Belarus, Mexico and Ireland." Id.
22. See St. Lucia Severs Diplomatic Ties with Taiwan, Recognizes People's Republic of China, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter St. Lucia Severs Diplomatic Ties].
23. See Phil Davison & Stephen Vines, Taiwan Mourns Loss of the Little Friend Stolen By Big Brother, Independent (London), Sept. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; St. Lucia Severs Diplomatic Ties, supra note 22; see also Laura Tyson, Taiwan Works Hard to Keep Allies: Diplomatic Rivalry with Beijing Shifts to Central America, Financial Times Limited (London), Aug. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing China's financial efforts to slow Taiwanese progress).
24. See Davison & Vines, supra note 23.
25. See id. President Mandela announced South Africa's decision to switch allegiance in November 1997. See id.
Half of those who still recognise Taiwan are in the Caribbean or Central America but several of these are re-appraising the situation, particularly since the handover of Hong Kong to China.
In the Caribbean, Taiwan is left with Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti and Saint Christopher and Nevis. The African list, headed by Senegal, Liberia and Chad, is also something less than big-time. In Europe only the Holy See, which has problems with China's establishment of a rival Catholic church, recognises Taiwan.Id.
27. Id. Additionally, this year's debate included, for the first time in five years, a country--that of Papua New Guinea--that spoke in support of Taiwan but yet does not maintain official ties. See Wu, supra note 21.
28. In 1988, "Taiwan held official membership in only eight international organizations." Chang & Lim, supra note 18, at 423 (footnote omitted).
29. The government of the ROC views the PRC's present Taiwan policy as "a full-scale effort to undermine the ROC's international status, force the ROC government to abandon pragmatic diplomacy and its effort to participate in the UN, and pressure Taipei into political negotiations on Peking's `one country, two systems' terms." Cross-Strait Relations, supra note 11, at 3-4. Taiwan has identified at least fifteen "specific instances in which the rights and interests of the Republic of China have been seriously compromised as a result of its exclusion from the United Nations and regional organizations." Government Information Office, Republic of China, Substantive Harm Caused to the Republic of China by its Exclusion From the United Nations and International and Regional Organizations 3 (1997) [hereinafter Substantive Harm] (on file with the New England Law Review).
30. See Interview with Taiwanese Government Official (Oct. 15, 1997).
32. See John Zarocostas, After China Balks at Taiwan Role in Summit, UN Agency Pulls Out, Journal of Commerce, Oct. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
33. See Tyson, supra note 23. Taiwan donated U.S. $800,000 to help organize the conference. See id.; see also Glenn Garvin, An Unlikely Battlefield; China and Taiwan Waging All-Out War of Diplomacy Over Panama Canal, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 31, 1997, at A4 (discussing the Panama conference).
34. See Interview with Taiwanese Government Official, supra note 30. Taiwan sought to donate U.S. $2 million to the Rwandan refugees and U.S. $500,000 to the Turkish Kurds. See id. China has also imposed retaliatory penalities on states that have assisted Taiwan's efforts. In August 1997, China vetoed a Security Council resolution to send UN monitors to Guatemala, ostensibly to punish Guatemala's past support of Taiwan. See Robert H. Reid, Fourteen Countries Ask General Assembly To Consider Readmitting Taiwan, Associated Press, Sept. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4884007. Eventually the resolution was passed. However, Guatemala did not support Taiwan's 1997 UN membership effort. See id.
35. Based on this argument, one could seemingly conclude that billionaire Ted Turner is entitled to some form of UN membership based on his U.S. $1 billion donation to help support UN activities.
36. Substantive Harm, supra note 29, at 1.
37. The PRC views "Washington as Taiwan's protector." Steven Mufson, Taiwan to Send Envoys to China, Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1998, at A31.
38. Taiwan's Milestone, supra note 15, at A24.
39. Interview with Taiwanese Government Official, supra note 30.
40. H.R. Con. Res. 212, 104th Cong. (1996).
41. S. Con. Res. 15, 105th Cong. (1997).
42. S. Con. Res. 30, 105th Cong. (1997). The Concurrent Resolution also advocates "that it should be United States policy to support -- (1) the admission of Taiwan to membership in all appropriate regional multilateral economic institutions." Id.
43. H.R. Res. 190, 105th Cong. (1997). Among other reasons, the Resolution noted that:
the United States and Taiwan have enjoyed a longstanding and uninterrupted friendship, which has only increased in light of the remarkable economic development and political liberalization in Taiwan in recent years . . . [and] Taiwan's accession to the WTO is important to the United States because it is the largest importer of United States goods that is not already a member of the WTO, and because Taiwan's entry into the WTO would promote significant new market opportunities for United States exporters and investors.Id.
44. H.R. Con. Res. 132, 105th Cong. (1997). The draft Resolution concluded that:
Taiwan's participation in international organizations would not prevent or imperil the eventual resolution of disputes between Taiwan and Mainland China any more than the participation in international organizations by the former West Germany and the former East Germany prevented the eventual settlement of Germany's national status by peaceful and democratic means.
Id. Therefore, the Resolution proposes that:
(1) Taiwan deserves full participation, including a seat, in the United Nations and its related agencies; and
(2) the Government of the United States should immediately encourage the United Nations to take action by considering the unique situation of Taiwan in the international community and adopting a comprehensive solution to accommodate Taiwan in the United Nations and its related agencies.Id. A similar resolution was passed by the House of Representatives in 1995 "by a vote of 396-0." Taiwan Welcomes US Congressmen's Motion on UN, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
45. H.R. Res. 225, 105th Cong. (1997).
[d]espite the absence of diplomatic relations and recognition of Taiwan as a country, U.S. federal law treats Taiwan as a state for enforcement of obligations and rights of Taiwan under U.S. law. Likewise, the applicable laws of Taiwan are the governing law whenever circumstances make application of U.S. law dependent on Taiwanese laws.Chang & Lim, supra note 18, at 430 n.111 (citation omitted). Taiwan, in fact, has undertaken this practice in order to avoid international sanctions. Believing that it would be sanctioned for engaging in the import and export of industrial waste based on its exclusion from the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention), Taiwan entered negotiations and bilateral agreements with state parties to abide by the Basel Convention. See Substantive Harm, supra note 29, at 7.
47. Yang, supra note 13 (quoting President Lee Teng-hui).
48. Oberdorfer, supra note 14, at C6. At the appropriate time, Taiwan may wish to consider seeking Observer Status--such as held by Switzerland, the Holy See, Nauru, and Tonga--at the UN. Many states that are now full members of the UN first began as Observers, and membership in many of the UN's specialized agencies are not as stringent as membership in the UN itself. A second possibility is to request a specialized form of Observer Status, such as possessed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which would permit important access and participation in certain UN affairs and debates. See E. Suy, The Status of Observers in International Organizations, 160 Academie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours 103 (1978). The legal basis for this specialized status can be found in resolutions of the General Assembly where specific organizations have been "invited" to participate in work of the UN that involved their interests. For example, specialized status was explicitly granted to the PLO in General Assembly Resolution 3237, G.A. Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2296th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), and to the South West Africa People's Organization in General Assembly Resolution 31/152. G.A. Res. 31/152, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., 105th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 39, at 136, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976). This potential avenue may well open the necessary doors at the UN that would one day lead to full membership. However, the framework underlying these procedures and an analysis of how Taiwan could function under this rubric is beyond the scope of this Article.