NEW ENGLAND INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW ANNUAL

ESTABLISHING A JOINT VENTURE WITH THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

A GUIDE FOR AMERICAN BUSINESSES

I. Introduction

When attempting to establish joint ventures (JV) with the People's Republic of China (PRC), a United States company (U.S. company) is confronted with myriad unique obstacles which, if dealt with properly, can be overcome and possibly avoided. The most important issues a U.S. company needs to address prior to entering into a JV with the PRC include the following: Is there a majority interest requirement? In what currency should dividends be dispersed? What is the exposure to liability under the corruption and anti-trust laws and how can it be minimized? Will the PRC have immunity and therefore, lack of deterrence from unfair practices? Who should control the JV? What type of special training is needed? How should the expatriate employees of U.S. companies be paid? Will the PRC be able to disperse high-risk loans? What forum should be used for dispute resolution? What rate of exchange should apply? What is the value of a letter of credit or guarantee from the PRC or one of its entities? What intellectual property laws should apply? Should the JV lease or buy equipment? What happens when a land-use right expires or when granted land is expropriated? How can the U.S. company retain control over major decisions of the JV when the PRC requires that it have majority ownership interest? And how can a U.S. company obtain acceptance of its preferred provisions of the JV contract when dealing with the PRC? This guide is designed to assist the reader in understanding the aforementioned issues. Having a working knowledge of these issues is vital to assure a successful JV with the PRC. In addition, simple awareness of certain issues can greatly reduce the frustration and the potential for misunderstandings which are inherent in JV agreement negotiations between a U.S. company and the PRC.

This note will take the reader from the evolution and the status quo of Chinese business law, all the way to the actual negotiation of an agreement. Section I, "Chinese Business Law: The Evolution and Status Quo," provides a brief introduction to the history of Chinese law. The reader is introduced to various business forms recognized by the PRC, followed by Chinese contract and registration of capital law. Next, several issues pertaining to property are examined, including leasing, allocated land-use rights, and expropriation. The State guarantee is analyzed, and then an introduction to the different avenues available for dispute resolution is provided. Section II takes the reader through currency issues including taxes and foreign exchange. Section III examines corrupt practices and anti-trust issues, including suggestions for minimizing exposure to violations of these laws. Ultimately, Section IV provides essential information and recommendations to be implemented at the time the agreement is negotiated, including seventeen clauses which are vital to the U.S. company-PRC JV agreement.

II. Chinese Business Law: The Evolution and Status Quo

A. Basic Law of the Land

Confucianism and Legalist philosophies create the foundation of Chinese legal tradition.(1) As early as the third century B.C., there had been tensions between and influences from both philosophies.(2) Legalist theory promotes deterrence through force and State power rather than focusing on morality.(3) To the contrary, Confucianism is based on the theory that social harmony may be attained by influencing the masses through the persuasion of a morally good role model. According to the Confucian philosophy, attempts to deter undesirable behavior through force and punishment are futile. In the Confucian society, the group is more important than the individual; "conflicts destroy the harmony within the group and disagreements are settled through yielding and compromise."(4) The Confucian philosophy does not recognize the court system as an acceptable means of resolving disputes. According to Confucian thought, court actions reflect the failure of a group to work harmoniously together and should be avoided at all costs.

The PRC has had five constitutions which theoretically have been the supreme law of the land.(5) "It is considered the 'mother-law' (mufa), from which all other laws are derived as if they were its children (zifa)."(6) The most recent constitution was adopted on December 4, 1984, and is known as the 1982 Constitution.(7) According to the 1982 Constitution, the power in China is held by the people's democratic dictatorship.(8) Workers, peasants, intellectuals, and other patriots supporting socialism and the unity of the motherland make up the "people" referred to in the 1982 Constitution.(9)

Although the 1982 Constitution theoretically preempts other laws, to have any legal effect its provisions require enactment of ordinary legislation.(10) Therefore, instead of providing a practical source of law, the Constitutional provisions merely provide guidelines.(11) In addition, courts are limited to the application of ordinary legislation and are not allowed to rely on constitutional provisions directly in deciding cases.(12) Moreover, judicial review of legislation, to ensure that newly enacted laws are consistent with the Constitution, does not exist.(13) The National People's Congress (NPC) has the power to make the laws and its Standing Committee has the power of review, however, it has never exercised its power of review.(14) "The [S]tate embodies the will of the proletariat, and courts are subordinate to the highest organs of [S]tate power."(15)

"Although there is no actual separation of powers, a certain degree of specialization does exist."(16) According to Article 126 of the Constitution, the courts theoretically are granted independent judicial power and are not subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organization or individual.(17) However, China's court system plays only a small role within the government hierarchy.(18) "In reality, the courts are weak institutions under heavy influence from party and regional interests."(19)

Today, China is still a one-party state with little regard for democracy or human rights.(20) Officially, China is a communist country with a "socialist" market economy. In reality, communism is dead and China is quickly transforming itself into a society powered by brutal capitalism.(21)

B. Business Law Generally

The 1988 Amendment to the Constitution acknowledged the existence of private business and granted it constitutional protection.(22) In addition, foreign enterprises' "lawful rights and interests are protected by the law"(23) via the Constitution. However, these rights are limited in that they are only guaranteed as long as they are in the interest of the State.(24)

The corporate form of business is not new to China.(25) Foreign companies established a stronghold in the country after the Opium War of 1840.(26) In addition, the late Qing dynasty promulgated its own company law in 1904 to "promote the creation of Chinese company to compete with the foreigners who were producing and marketing their goods on Chinese soil."(27) The succeeding Nationalist Government continued Qing's reforms by codifying a new company law in 1929.(28)

Under Mao Zedong's leadership in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (the Party) briefly allowed the 11,298 existing companies to remain in operation before it declared the corporate enterprise inimical to socialism.(29) By the early 1950s, the Party had nationalized or collectivized all privately held companies.(30) The Party directives and Maoist ideology, rather than market-oriented supply-and-demand forces, governed state owned companies (SOC).(31) By 1958, all land and most means of production were nationalized and the commune system was established.(32)

In 1978, after Deng Xiaoping seized power, economic reforms began(33) and the economy grew quickly.(34) This was followed by the dismantling of the commune system which resulted in the government contracting out farming to the peasants. Not long thereafter, a land-use right was created(35) and ownership of private business was permitted.

Another important development was the promulgation of the Civil Law of 1986 which re-established a legal basis for private business in its corporate form.(36) In addition, since 1986, the government has allowed thousands of formerly state run enterprises to convert to stock companies. Companies are now being listed on the newly-formed Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, as well as on a few foreign exchanges.(37) Today, venture capital can be raised through the stock markets.(38) However, China's stock exchange is bifurcated. "A" shares are available only to Chinese investors, while "B" shares can be purchased by foreign investors.(39) The bifurcated exchange, coupled with large-scale speculation, deterred some potential major investors who remain "wary of China's political and economic stability as well as its murky legal system."(40)

The Civil Law also provides for the regulation of business and personal relationships among Chinese citizens, between "legal persons," and between citizens and "legal persons."(41) "Legal persons," as referred to in the Civil Law, include JVs, SOCs, and new companies. In other words, the "legal persons" that the law creates can be fictional corporate persons.(42) They obtain this status when the enterprises are established in accordance with the appropriate law.(43) Accordingly, the Civil Law guarantees that once establishment and registration are complete, an enterprise is a "legal person" that has the capacity for civil rights in conducting lawful activities -- it may lawfully conduct business under the protection of law.(44) As a "legal person," the entity gains a judicial remedy in the event of a contractual or other breach of law by another company, a JV, a SOC or a Chinese citizen.(45)

One of the State's priorities is to continue its control over the business and economic activities within China. Therefore, through its various ministries, the State maintains a controlling share in new ventures.(46) As a result, China's so-called "privatization" is a form of limited privatization.(47) This limited privatization allows the Party to draw on the Marxist principle that, so long as the government retains a majority share in the enterprise, it remains in the "people's" hands.(48) It is important to know that through its controlling interest in JVs, the PRC has been in the practice of dispersing high risk loans from JVs to PRC entities. Many times these entities have gone insolvent, and thus, were unable to pay back the loans. A U.S. company in such a situation has little or no recourse unless this practice was not prohibited by the terms of the JV contract.

Like many nations, China often previews impending policy shifts via news leaks and "official" publications.(49) However, it is important to be aware that such communications may be trial balloons that can be plausibly denied if there is a vehement reaction.(50) China's aspirational declarations usually appear in official newspapers like The China Daily or The People's Daily.(51)

To know and understand China's unwritten laws, referred to as its Operational Code, is sometimes more important than knowing its written laws. Being ignorant of China's Operational Code can be expensive and risky. In fact, it cost an American businessman a $300 million dinner, including tip.(52) For important suggestions related to the Operational Code see Section IV of this note, "Negotiating the Agreement." With regard to business form selection, JVs with state-owned enterprises are the Chinese authorities' preferred mode of economic cooperation with foreign investors.(53) Fortunately for U.S. investors, China has abolished its prohibitions against foreign majority ownership in JVs.(54)

C. Contract Law

"Contracts in China have more of a sense of moral obligation than absolute rights,"(55) and according to a Beijing-based American lawyer, "[t]here is no concept that [they are] binding."(56) In fact, contracts can always be renegotiated. In an effort to create a more consistent contract practice, seminars are being held where sample contracts and handbooks are being distributed. However, reciprocity remains a major issue to be resolved before critics will believe in China's sincerity in reforming its contract law.(57) Until Chinese courts enforce foreign legal decisions, the comfort level of foreign investors will remain low.(58)

D. Capital Registration Laws

China has very specific "registered capital"(59) requirements for all Chinese-foreign equity JVs.(60) The Chinese have a vested interest in such specificity because, according to official figures, they have more than 170,000 foreign-funded ventures with a gross investment of approximately sixty billion dollars.(61)

Article II of the Capital Registration Law states that "[t]he parties to the joint venture shall share profits and bear risks and losses according to the proportion of registered capital."(62) This issue arose earlier when China introduced new regulations targeting foreign companies that allegedly inflate the value of their assets to cheat their Chinese partners.(63) An official Chinese report stated, "[b]y overvaluing their assets, some foreign investors have been claiming a disproportionately large share of profits, which are nailed down according to each side's stated investment."(64) The new "registered capital" regulations include an evaluation procedure which will aid officials in ascertaining the real value of a foreign investment.(65)

E. Property Law and Leasing

The advancement of property law had been slow and ongoing because there was no real need for an advanced property law in the PRC(66) until after the 1978 economic reform movement began. A Constitutional amendment was adopted which protects the so-called "economic ownership" of land.(67) By 1992, a real estate market for urban land existed. In addition, the state protected the right of citizens to own lawfully earned [or inherited] income, savings, houses and other lawful property.(68)

Leasing in China is similar to leasing in the United States, in that the lessor retains legal title even though the lessee has actual possession.(69) However, an important factor regarding leasing in China is that since there is no reliable legal framework. Actual possession often means a de facto ownership, regardless of who holds title to the property.

When financial leases are entered into, Chinese or JV leasing companies borrow money from banks and use the funds to buy equipment for the lessee.(70) JV companies can often get funds from foreign banks, whereas Chinese companies typically lack the credibility needed to borrow from such a source.(71) Under the purchase agreement between the manufacturer and the lessor, the lessee is named as the user in the contract, but the ownership is retained by the lessor.(72) The point of this arrangement is that the end-user may then claim warranty under the contract with the manufacturer.(73) After the installation certificate has been signed, the leasing company assumes the economic but not the technical risk.(74)

Financial leasing in China is different from financial leasing in the West. The pay-back time is very short, normally only three years.(75) Therefore, the payback time is too short to let the machines pay themselves off. However, because of the market risk, no leasing company is prepared to grant a ten year payment period, which in many cases would better reflect the depreciation.(76) In addition, because of the unreliable property system and the short payback time, a guarantee from a third party is always needed. Unlike leasing in the United States, the end-user, lessee, lists the equipment as an asset instead of a cost in its bookkeeping and thus, it is more like acquiring a bank loan than leasing.(77)

F. Allocated Land-Use Rights

Allocated land-use rights are different from granted rights, in that the government provides land to the land user without consideration.(78) Although the land-use right normally has no time limit, (79) the land user's rights can be revoked at any time by the State.(80) When the State exercises its right of revocation, it is obligated to compensate the land-user for the structures on the land.(81) Also, allocated land may not be transferred without state consent whereas granted land can be freely transferred.(82) In addition, if a land-user needs to change the purpose of the land-use, as specified in the contract, he must obtain permission from the grantor and the city planning department.(83)

A disadvantage to the land-use contract is that the contract fee must be paid before a transfer is permitted.(84) However, like other regulations in China, this regulation is not always adhered to. To transfer real estate, the land-use certificate and the certificate of title to the buildings must be presented to the State Land Administration Bureau (SLAB) of the municipal or county.(85) Another disadvantage to the land-use contract is that after the land-use right contract expires, the land and all the buildings thereon is returned to the State without compensation.(86) If the land user needs to continue using the land, he must apply for an extension no later than one year before the expiration date of the contract.(87) Unless the land needs to be recovered for "social and public" interests, such an application shall be approved.(88)

When the parties enter into a transfer or grant contract, all rights to and liabilities from the property are transferred from the seller to the buyer with respect to the new owner's relationship with the SLAB.(89) The time limit of the land-use is therefore the remaining time of the period specified in the original grant contract.(90)

In the 1990 Grant Regulations, the state reserved the right to intervene in the real estate market.(91) For example, the local government has a pre-emptive purchase right if the transfer price is "substantially" lower than the market price.(92) In addition, if the market price rises irrationally, the local government may take "necessary measures."(93)

G. Expropriation

The state will not recover the land-use right from the land-user before expiration of the term specified in the contract.(94) However, the right to expropriate the land is reserved by the state "under special circumstances and in the light of social and public interests."(95) When the state expropriates the land, the land-user should be compensated according to the number of years left on the contract and the extent to which the land has been developed.(96) As the compensation is decided by the government, it tends to be significantly lower than market value.(97)

H. The Guarantee

In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that getting compensation from guarantors is difficult in China.(98) Guarantees from a local government agency are not necessarily honored and the central government does not necessarily stand behind the commitments of its SOCs.(99) Local government agencies or companies and local banks often claim they were forced to sign the guarantee and they therefore are not liable, or claim that there is no money available to pay the guarantee.(100) Furthermore, the local courts are neither willing nor have the power to force the local governments to honor their promises.(101) Since 1988, government agencies are not allowed to guarantee loans or leasing.(102) Today, the local government creates government-owned companies which in turn give the guarantees on loans and leases, thus making claims against the local government itself more difficult.(103)

I. Dispute Resolution

In the past, the Chinese merchants relied on trust, guarantors and a web of interlocking obligations instead of laws.(104) Guilds and other nonofficial bodies were used by the merchants to enforce contracts.(105) As a result, informal solutions to resolve conflicts have a long tradition in China. This is explained by the interplay of Confucian values and the unattractiveness of the imperial court system.(106) Today, there are four types of dispute resolution in China: mediation (xieshang), conciliation (tiaojie), arbitration (zhongcai), and court verdict (panjue).(107)

1. The Chinese Courts

In selecting a forum to resolve a dispute, it should be noted that the traditional view of the Chinese is that bringing a dispute to court reflects failure and disrupts the harmony that is so precious to the Confucian philosophy. In fact, litigation has been discouraged by government officials and in Imperial China penalties were imposed on those bringing a lawsuit.(108) Even today, the law is viewed as a means to control and punish criminals, but not a means to protect non-criminal legal rights. As discussed in Section II of this note, the lack of judicial power of the courts, relating to non-criminal actions, impedes the remedial process and creates a virtually deterrent free environment. For example, unlike in the United States where judgments in one state are recognized by another under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,(109) the courts of one Chinese province do not often recognize or order execution of extraterritorial judgments. This is especially true when the judgment has a negative impact on an entity within that court's district.(110) This is not to say there is no chance of prevailing in a civil law suit at a court in China. In an attempt to address the Chinese court problems, the president of the Supreme People's Court has admonished lower courts to be more consistent and equitable.(111) In addition, multinational corporations, such as Walt Disney Company, have successfully litigated intellectual property suits in Chinese courts.(112) In fact, intellectual property protection practices are becoming more westernized.(113) However, the lack of enforcement and remedies regarding this type of vulnerable property makes it necessary to include explicit language, pertaining to the same, in any JV agreement with the PRC. It should also be noted that in 1987 China ratified the New York Convention, and thus, is more prone to recognize foreign arbitral awards.(114)

2. Alternative Dispute Resolution.

As with western mediation, a mutually satisfactory solution based on voluntary negotiations between the parties is attempted. Unless otherwise provided in the contract, the next non-binding attempt at settlement is conciliation which may be conducted by the People's Conciliation Committees. Should these non-binding attempts fail, arbitration is typically the next step towards resolution. Unlike western arbitration, the Chinese have two arbitration procedures, one of which is designated for disputes involving foreign entities and the other for disputes involving only domestic parties.(115) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, arbitration involving foreigners can be conducted by the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) or the China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC).

III. Currency

A. Generally

The Chinese currency was named renminbi (literally the "people's currency" in Mandarin Chinese) with its unit referred to as the yuan.(116) The central government sets national policies,(117) and large district governments carry out foreign exchange control using their own provisional measures.(118) There have been two main foreign exchange policies: one forbidding circulation of foreign currencies within China, and the other providing for state supervision over all inflows and outflows of foreign exchange.(119) Thus, the PRC has attempted to strictly control currency.

B. Taxes

Joint Ventures of PRC-U.S. companies are given sizeable tax breaks.(120) In 1984, President Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang signed the first income tax treaty between China and America known as the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Evasion (Sino-U.S. Agreement).(121) The Sino-U.S. Agreement aimed "to reduce double taxation of income earned by residents of either country from sources within the other country. Another goal of the Sino-U.S. Agreement was to prevent avoidance of the income taxes imposed by the taxing authority of either country."(122) Under the Sino-U.S. Agreement, unless the business activities in China are "substantial enough to constitute a permanent establishment or fixed base," China cannot tax foreign business income and the same applies to the United States.(123) While dividends, interest, and royalties received by a foreign investor may be taxed by both countries, they will be taxed by the source country(124) on a restricted basis.(125) The treaty provides for a maximum withholding rate of 10 percent and thereby provides tax relief when compared with the customary 20 percent Chinese rate and 30 percent American rate.(126)

Additionally, the PRC has established areas of preferential treatment for foreign direct investments, known as Special Economic Zones and Economic and Technological Development Zones, which offer both foreign and domestic investors measurable preference in taxation, employment, utilities, and other business considerations.(127) These areas have served as testing grounds for reforms of business law and trading practices, including foreign exchange provisions.(128) However, China's apparent intent to assist foreign investors does not negate "[t]he complexity of China's foreign exchange [which] has become one of the greatest challenges for outsiders wishing to do business in the country."(129)

C. Foreign Exchange

Foreign exchange has always been a problem in China. The American Motors Corporation (AMC) JV in Beijing is one well-known example.(130) Unfortunately, early pioneers, such as AMC, learned the danger of doing business in a country lacking legal protection for foreign investors when they were unable to repatriate their profits.(131) Because of a shortage of foreign exchange to pay for parts, production of the "Beijing Jeep" was completely halted in early 1986.(132) Ultimately, AMC solved the problem and the enterprise, now controlled by Chrysler, remains an investor in China today.(133) However, AMC's experience was not an anomaly and others like it dampened the attractive foreign investment climate. Under the strict enforcement of PRC law, generating foreign exchange was a major problem for managers of foreign funded enterprises, especially in the production sector.(134) In response, the PRC reconsidered the goals of the "open door" policy,(135) and began to welcome investment that brought in other kinds of benefits, like the transfer of new and more efficient technology.(136) To codify China's new view, regulations were promulgated in 1986 and 1987 to provide several methods, other than export, of obtaining foreign exchange.(137)

D. Alternative Means of Obtaining Foreign Currency

Methods set forth by the new 1986 and 1987 regulations include swap markets and import substitution. In addition, the means of obtaining foreign currency which is not officially regulated is known as the Black Market.

Probably the most successful of the PRC's efforts,(138) the swap markets, allow firms to balance their foreign exchange by trading renminbi for foreign exchange with other firms that have a surplus.(139) Retention quotas are given in the form of certificates to domestic enterprises that generate a foreign exchange surplus which allow for a later purchase of foreign exchange.(140) Eventually, all foreign invested enterprises were granted entry into the former retention quota market, which became known as the swap markets.(141)

The swap markets are governed by the State General Administration of Exchange Control and its various sub-bureaus, and transactions take place in Foreign Exchange Transaction Centers (also referred to as "swap markets").(142) FETCs are located in major cities and accommodate the multitude of enterprises with foreign exchange needs. In 1992, a national swap market was established in Beijing to better unify prices at swap centers across the country.(143) However, regional protectionist policies prevented cross-border swapping(144) and thus kept exchange rates higher in certain outlying exchange centers away from China's economic zones when demand out-paced supply.(145)

At one time, import substitution was used as a means of foreign exchange in China. However, the Chinese government has promised to eliminate import substitution policies in its market access memorandum of understanding with the United States.(146)

E. Foreign Exchange Rates

There are three rates of exchange in the PRC: the "official rate," the "swap rate," and the "black market rate." The official rate is fairly stable and is available on a daily basis at the Bank of China. The swap rate varies "as swap markets in different geographical areas operate under varying local rules and market conditions (supply and demand)."(147) The "black market rate" is more volatile than the swap market, as there is less official control over it.

Until recently, black market currency exchanges remained small in nature, relegated to curbside transactions with foreign nationals working or traveling in China.(148) Similar to the swap market, the rates in these transactions were set by supply and demand, on a more localized scale.(149) However, increases in foreign exchange demand led to an increase in the size of black market trades, as some firms began by passing the swap markets altogether.(150) The black market has since developed its own "market makers."

IV. Corrupt Practices and Anti-Trust

A. The Status Quo in The PRC

U.S. companies which are active in China should be aware of their potential exposure under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).(151) Since most U.S. direct investment in China is in equity JVs with state enterprises,(152) the lack of control of the business operations lends itself to problems with FCPA compliance. In the JV, FCPA liability through a third party's conduct attaches easily as a result of the Act's broad intent of regulating U.S. corporate behavior abroad. Exposure to the anti-bribery provision of the Act in the joint venture setting is magnified when the U.S. company is the minority partner. The U.S. company's own employees, who are U.S. citizens or residents, are individually subject to the FCPA and are thereby less likely to violate the Act.(153) However, the foreign sales agent is not subject to the Act. Nevertheless, the agent's conduct or practices may create FCPA exposure to the U.S. company. The major problem regarding this issue is that many agents are unaware of the Act, and bribery in some places is a customary way of doing business. Notwithstanding the fact that minority partners in U.S. company-PRC JVs are afforded the good faith/due diligence safe harbor in the accounting provision,(154) they may nonetheless be subject to the anti-bribery provision, which is ambiguous with regard to the question of liability.(155)

The rampant corrupt practices in China compound the problem of FCPA exposure for a U.S. company. Ever since Deng Xiao Ping made his famous remark that "it is glorious to get rich," government and party officials alike "have taken the statement to heart."(156) As a growing number of Chinese officials exchange their connections and influence for financial gain, the tide of corruption seems to be uncontrollable.(157) Some China watchers opine that corruption is almost "institutionalized" in the PRC,(158) and "payoffs, kickbacks, graft and bribery…have become a daily feature of doing business with China."(159)

Officials are reportedly often soliciting bribes from foreign businessmen negotiating for contracts in China.(160) The request for bribes has progressed from the taking of gifts to requesting kickbacks based on a percentage of the sales commission or an outright demand for money.(161) However, U.S. companies involved in a PRC JV are in a so-called "catch 22" situation. That is, if they submit or acquiesce to the bribery, they are subject to liability under the FCPA, and if they are firm and do not submit, they invite frustration, the risk of deals falling through and threats to keep silent about the bribery requests. In fact, if a U.S. company abruptly turns down corrupt demands, "it could lead to an army of inspectors arriving at [their] workplace . . . to search for and find every violation they can imagine."(162)

United States' companies should also be aware that Chinese parties frequently bluff and are just "trying it on."(163) For example, an American corporate investigator reported that a $100,000 bribery demand was dropped after a Chinese manager "laughed in disgust" for a few minutes.(164)

B. Applicable United States Anti-Corruption Law

The FCPA is applicable to U.S. nationals while they are within the territory of the United States and while they are doing business on foreign soil. Therefore, if a national of the United States violates the FCPA, the U.S. courts will have nationality jurisdiction to prosecute the person and/or entity. Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have authority to enforce the Act, although the DOJ has sole authority over related criminal prosecutions.(165)

Liability under the anti-bribery provision is not based on clear-cut ownership or degree of control, but on "knowledge" possessed by the U.S. parent company.(166) The Act requires the compliance of third parties if a U.S. company "knows" that the intermediary will engage in corrupt practices.(167) The Act defines "knowledge" as: (1) awareness that one is engaging in illegal conduct, or that the circumstance exists; (2) a firm belief that such circumstance exists; and (3) awareness of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance.(168) Consequently, FCPA liability may be imposed where arrangements between the parent and the subsidiary are sufficiently close, such that the U.S. parent either knows of or suspects a high probability of improper conduct by the subsidiary. (169) In considering prosecution under the FCPA, the DOJ asks whether the U.S. company had knowledge that the intermediary would use the particular means, for example, a sales commission used to bribe a foreign official.(170) In addition, officers, directors, stockholders, agents, or employees of a U.S. company are individually subject to the FCPA.(171) A violation of the anti-bribery provision includes five elements. The FCPA makes it a criminal offense if any domestic concern:

(1) makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce;

(2) corruptly in furtherance of an offer, gift, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money or anything of value;

(3) to any "foreign official," foreign political party, foreign political party official or candidates for office (collectively, "foreign recipient"), or to any person while "knowing" that all or a part of the thing of value will be offered to a foreign recipient;

(4) for the purpose of influencing any official act or decision or inducing the foreign recipient to act in violation of his lawful duty, or induce such recipient to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality to affect any decision of that government or instrumentality;

(5) in order to assist the public company or domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.(172)

In short, the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA primarily prohibits U.S. companies from (1) using interstate commerce (2) to corruptly pay (3) foreign officials (4) for the purpose of influencing an official act (5) in order to obtain or retain business.(173) However, the Act provides an affirmative defense which makes the payments legal if they are lawful under the written laws of a foreign country.(174) Therefore, local counsel should be contacted to find out which payments are lawful under the written laws of the PRC. However, when selecting a local attorney one should be aware that an applicant does not need to have a law school diploma to be admitted to the bar according to the Regulations on Lawyers,(175) and foreign lawyers remain barred from practicing local law.(176)

C. Minimizing Exposure to the FCPA

The JV form of business lends itself to a high risk of FCPA violations. This is so because the JV in the PRC is likely to be predominately owned by a PRC entity and these entities are accustomed to acts of bribery as discussed previously. However, a U.S. company may reduce the risk of exposure by implementing the following tactics.

1. Negotiating an Anti-Bribery Clause.

While negotiating the JV agreement, the U.S. company should make it clear from the outset that the company does not give bribes, does not take bribes and will not tolerate any acts of "monetary bribery." However, the company need not prohibit "legal bribery," which is the offering of benefits such as information on new technologies, prestige, recognition or donations to local charities.(177) Also, to increase leverage, the U.S. company should associate with other firms that refuse to succumb to bribery. Creating a united front may discourage those who engage in corruption from taking retaliatory action against the company.

2. Heighten Employee Awareness

The company should establish internal regulations and assure that all of its employees and agents are informed and trained on the relevant provisions of the FCPA. This includes distribution of copies of the relevant regulations in both the English and Chinese languages. In addition, employment should be made contingent upon, inter alia, the employee's compliance with the FCPA and other relevant laws. Furthermore, there should be incentives offered for employees who report employee noncompliance.

3. Become Aware of the Gray Areas

There are no bright line tests with regard to the legality or illegality of the following acts: payment to "improved sales" in China, such as paid "inspection trips" for Chinese officials;(178) sponsoring overseas education of trading official's children;(179) black market for import and export licenses;(180) bribery to expedite goods through customs and the Commodity Inspection Bureau;(181) and splitting sales commissions and kickbacks.(182) The U.S. company should also be aware that it is not always easy to distinguish between an official and a nonofficial in a socialist state such as the PRC(183)

4. Check Out Legality Issues When in Doubt.

When confronted with a specific instance in which the U.S. company has doubt with regard to the legality of a transaction, upon request, the DOJ will provide the company with an opinion determining the legitimacy of the transaction.(184) The benefit of such an approval from the DOJ is that the transaction will be presumed to be legitimate and innocent with respect to DOJ enforcement.(185)

D. PRC's Anti-Unfair Competition Law

The PRC's Anti-Unfair Competition Law prohibits bidding conspiracies. Tendering parties may not collude in the submission of tenders in order to force the tender price up or down.(186) In addition, it provides that tendering parties and the party that invited the tender may not collude with each other in order to force out fair competition.(187) Any such collusive bid which results in a winning tender is void.(188) These provisions are much narrower in scope than their counterparts found in the United States Sherman Act.(189) The United States courts have recognized an exception where there is a State-sponsored market organization, to the general rule punishing concerted activity to restrict production or sales.(190) However, the U.S. companies remain under the jurisdiction of the United States courts and must comply with the Sherman Act at home and abroad. Therefore, if the JV, its employees or agents commit acts in violation of the Sherman Act, the U.S. companies as a private party will be exposed to liability under the Sherman Act.

The PRC's Anti-Unfair Competition Law also prohibits monopolization, including predatory pricing. However, the following are exceptions to this law: sales of fresh or live products; disposal of products whose period of validity is about to expire or which are overstocked; seasonal discounts; or sales to satisfy debt payments, to make changes in lines of production, or in the course of winding up a business.(191)

V. Negotiating The Agreement

A. Cultural and Customary Issues

Whereas American investors look for a joint venture to meet criteria of acceptability, such as whether it conforms with China's laws, tax code, and labor regulations, "Chinese officials want to evaluate the project's desirability, by looking at what benefits" China may derive from the project.(192) Will the project bring new investment, foreign exchange, employment, or--most desirably--technology transfer or will it simply "separate Chinese buyers from their money" and pad the wallets of foreign investors?(193) "Return on investment isn't the goal in China; stability is."(194) Investment that produces exports or capital goods, such as machine tools for the domestic market, is viewed as beneficial to China because it develops China's industrial capacity and increases its wealth. In addition, the bureaucrats (referred to as "apparatchiks") that examine investment proposals evaluate them against their own personal and bureaucratic self-interests.(195) Therefore, a toy store probably will not contribute to China's economic growth and therefore is not a preferred foreign investment venture.(196) The ultimate desirable goal is maintaining political control.(197) The political fiction of "democratic centralism" and the superiority of planned economies have few adherents in China today. The raison d'etre(198) of the Party is to remain in power.(199) To this end, China will sacrifice economic growth every time. "This is why Chinese law requires almost without exception that foreign investment be put in a JV . . . with the indigenous firm gaining majority control at some point."(200)

Whether a legacy of their long colonial past or not, the Chinese are still extremely wary of foreigners.(201) They seek capital and know-how, not friendships. Every business negotiation is an adversarial encounter.(202) Likewise, the Chinese believe every deal has a winner and a loser.(203)

Additionally, contracts can always be renegotiated, as discussed previously in the business law section, and therefore, negotiations never really end. The Chinese tend to be extraordinarily patient and they may try to outlast foreign negotiators via repeatedly re-visiting items agreed upon months before. Furthermore, "the outcome of contract disputes--and indeed the whole emphasis of law in China--is more a question of agreement than the application of principles."(204) Therefore, if "there's a change made in the contract, put it in writing on the spot, so there's no misunderstanding later."(205)

What makes negotiating with Chinese entities more time consuming and frustrating is that the people with whom you negotiate a deal are usually not those who can give the thumbs up or thumbs down.(206) Rather, your negotiating partner is probably one of the thousands of young Chinese who have studied in the West and speak English.(207) More often than not, your partner reports to "the guy with the bad haircut sitting behind a grey metal desk who makes the decisions."(208) In addition, Chinese negotiators do not usually receive a commission for making the deal, and therefore lack incentive to close the deal. Personal bonds are built at dinners and banquets and simple gestures, such as offering your counterpart a lift after negotiating all day, can cement a deal.(209) Small gifts and favors fortify key relationships. For example, a Coke bottler periodically sends cases of the soft drink to important local bureaucrats in order to keep them in his corner.(210) Another tactic the Chinese are known for is bluffing their way to a concession by switching negotiators.(211) However, one should keep in mind that "China is heavily bureaucratic, and ... your [former negotiating partner] may not want the new negotiator at the table any more than you do."(212) Also, the Chinese will usually back down if their "hardball tactics" are challenged.(213)

Capitalism and free enterprise are still a relatively new phenomenon and the PRC's view is still tinged with its history of central planning. For example, while an American manager might be rewarded for streamlining production and for revitalizing a manufacturing facility by reducing unneeded staff, a Chinese manager would likely to be fired and perhaps physically attacked for inflicting hardship on his workers.(214) As stability is paramount, efficiency will be achieved by attrition and employee buy-outs, and only then in lockstep with your Chinese partners.(215)

B. Critical Terms of the Agreement

There are substantial risks in entering a JV agreement with the PRC. High risks produce high returns, but also increase the chance of failure. In addition to boiler plate provisions of a JV agreement, such an agreement by and between the U.S. Company and a PRC entity should address the unique issues which are likely to arise during the life of the JV. Therefore, in addition to the basic joint venture provisions, the agreement should include the following provisions.(216)

1. Interest. The percentage of interest in the joint venture held by both parties should be determined on the bases of the monetary investment and know-how investment. However, the PRC may require that it hold a certain percentage of interest in the venture.

2. Dividends. Guarantee from the PRC of profit and dividends to the U.S. company in U.S. dollars not in products.

3. Anti-bribery and anti-trust policy. Agreement to prohibit bribery, anti-trust violations and related activities by all members of the JV.

4. Indemnification. Indemnification from the PRC for illegal acts committed by agents or employees not originally part of the U.S. company.

5. Board of Directors. Board of Directors should consist primarily of U.S. company persons.

6. Training. Training for all JV agents and employees regarding the FCPA and the Sherman Act including bilingual training manuals containing copies of the acts.

7. Compensation. Compensation to all expatriate personnel supplied by the U.S. company should be paid in U.S. dollars or other hard currency.

8. Loans. No loans to outside entities shall be made without the express written consent of the majority of the U.S. company shareholders.

9. Immunity. PRC waiver of Act of State immunity and Foreign Sovereign Immunity with regard to all matters relating to the JV.

10. Expropriation. Guarantee from the PRC that they will not expropriate the property owned by the JV.

11. Arbitration. Agreement to arbitrate should a dispute arise out of the JV and application of United States law. Designation of specific arbitration institution should be expressly provided.

12. Exchange rate. It is important to include the specific basis for calculating the rate of exchange to be applied when payments are made from the JV to the U.S. company.

13. Letter of credit. A Letter of Credit and Stand-by Letter of Credit should be rendered by banks outside of the PRC.

14. Intellectual Property. The Joint Venture and its members should agree to comply with United States law pertaining to intellectual property rights. Any dispute relating to intellectual property should be governed by United States law including but not limited to the Lanham Act.(217)

15. Leasing v. bank loan. In lieu of leasing equipment, the JV should acquire a bank loan to purchase equipment.

16. Land-use rights. If the JV enters into a land-use contract, the JV should make sure that the expiration date on the contract is not before the date the JV can foreseeably predict its operation on that land to end. This is important because at the date of expiration, the land will be returned to the State with the buildings thereon and without compensation. In addition, the PRC should also waive their right to expropriate any land the JV acquires or promise to provide fair market value, to be determined by an expert designated by the U.S. company, for the buildings thereon.

17. Veto. If the U.S. company must take a minority interest, it should retain a veto power over critical decisions.

The PRC holds technological advances at a very high value because it improves the State which is, after all, their raison d'etre. Therefore, the use of technological know-how as leverage should facilitate a U.S. company in its efforts to gain acceptance for the agreement provisions it prefers.

VI. Conclusion

The preceding overview of the issues unique to a JV with the PRC has attempted to demonstrate that knowledge and understanding of these components is vital to secure a successful JV with the PRC. It has also shown that absent knowledge and awareness of cultural and customary issues, a JV with the PRC can be, at the least, frustrating and can lead to exposure to violations of United States laws and PRC laws. Furthermore, in light of the bundle of sticks presented in this note, the following factors should be considered prior to establishing a JV with the PRC: majority interest requirements; currency; dividends; exposure to liability; corruption and anti-trust laws; PRC immunity; unfair practices; control over the JV; special training; means of payment to U.S. expatriates; dispersal of high risk loans; dispute resolution forums; exchange rate; value of letters of credit or guarantees; intellectual property laws; leasing vs. buying equipment; land-use rights; expropriation; veto power; and, means of obtaining acceptance of preferred provisions of the contract. If this note has provided its readers with a better understanding of these issues unique to establishing a JV with the PRC, it has served its purpose.

Michelle Rice

1. See Jonas Alsen, An Introduction to Chinese Property Law, 20 MD.J. Int'l L.& Trade 1, 4 (1996).

2. See id.

3. See Law in The People's Republic of China 1, at 2 (Folsom, R.H. & Minan J.H. eds., 1989).

4. Alsen, supra note 1, at 4.

5. See Alsen, supra note 1, (referring to PRC Const. pmbl., P 13 and art. 5).

6. Alsen, supra note 1, at 9.

7. The 1982 Constitution was adopted on December 4, 1984 and has since been amended.

8. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 8, (referring to PRC Const. art. 1.).

9. See Albert H.Y. Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of China 40, at 47 (1992).

10. See Alsen, supra note1, at 9.

11. See id.

12. See id.

13. See Chen, supra note 9, at 46.

14. Alsen, supra note 1, at 9.

15. Rob Jagtenberg & Annie de Roo, Dispute settlement in China: Law or policy?, in Administrative Reform in China Since 1978, 27, at 55 (Dong Lisheng ed. 1994).

16. Alsen, supra note 1, at 18.

17. See id.

18. See Michael Irl Nikkel, "Chinese Characteristics" in Corporate Clothing: Quest ions of Fiduciary Duty in China's Company Law, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 503, 512 (1995).

19. Alsen, supra note 1, at 18.

20. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 4.

21. See id.

22. See PRC Const. Art. 10, P 4 (amended 1988).

23. PRC Const. Art.18.

24. Chen, supra note 9, at 53. (This subordination of individual rights to state interests is consistent with the Marxist tradition.) The Deng regime has repeatedly stressed that any exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms that violates any of the "Four Basic Principles" is unconstitutional and unlawful. The four principles (keeping to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, insisting on the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought) are enshrined in the preamble to the 1982 Constitution. They were first introduced by Deng Xiaoping in March 1979 as a response to the Democracy wall movement of 1978-79). See id. at 53.

25. See generally Zhongguo Zhengquan Shouce, China Securities Handbook, 513-16, 527-29 (Liu Hongru ed., 1992) (providing historical background of China's securities market).

26. "[T]he Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China…launched a policy of economic reform and opened China to increased contacts with the outside world." Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 62, 65 n. 6 (1993).

27. William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. Asian Stud. 43 (1995).

28. See Kirby, supra note 27, at 51-52 (providing a brief history of China's corporate regulatory past prior to the formation of the Communist state under Mao Zedong).

29. See Kirby, supra note 27, at 56.

30. See id. at 56.

31. See Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to do With it? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 1, 5 - 6 (1991). Production directives proffered by China's central government were never as extensive as the former Soviet Union's. See id.

32. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 56. Peasants were put into communes made up of several thousand people. Within the communes, families would work together in smaller production units. See id.

33. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 5.

34. Note that China's gross national product grew from 362 billion yuan in 1978 to 4.4. trillion yuan in 1994. State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 20-21 (1995).

35. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 6.

36. See Kirby, supra note 27, at 43 (discussing the history of China's corporatization process).

37. See, e.g., Li Hong, More State Firms Liable for Profits and Losses, China Daily, Aug. 12, 1993, at 1; David Whittall, Heavy Hitting H Shares: Baring H Share Index, China Bus. Rev., May 1994, at 44.

38. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 6.

39. See Craig S. Smith, China Markets, Hot for Now, May Turn Cool, Wall St. J., May 22, 1995, at B8A.

40. Id.

41. The first of such laws was Guowuyuan Guanyu Chengzhen Feinongye Geti Jingji Ruogan Zhengcexing Guiding [Certain Policy Provisions by the State Council of the PRC Relating to the Non-agricultural Individual Economy in Cities and Townships] art. 2, in 1 Zhongguo Jingji Guanli Fagui Wenjian Huibian [Provision and Document Collection of the Management of China's Economy] 377-79 (Jilin Renmin Chubanshe [Jilin People's Publishing House] 1985). "Individual enterprises" obtained their legal status with the passage of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [The General Rules of the Civil Law of the PRC] s IV, art. 28 (adopted Apr. 12, 1986), translated in 3 Commercial, Business and Trade Laws: People's Republic of China 59 (Owen D. Nee ed., 1987) [hereinafter Civil Law].

42. See Nikkel, supra note 18, at 510.

43. See Civil Law, supra note 41, art. 37. The entity must have the necessary funding to bear civil liability and properly register its name, organizational structure, place of business, and designate a person or persons who will represent the enterprise in capacity as a legal person. See id. art. 37, 38.

44. See Civil Law, supra note 41, art. 36, 41.

45. See Nikkel, supra note 43, at 510.

46. See Ren Kan, The State of the State's Shares, China Daily, May 3, 1993, at 3 (introducing the three types of shares for domestic shareholders in China).

47. See generally, Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Company in China, 1993 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 301, 306 (analyzing China's privatization scheme). See also, Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of State Property in Post-Socialist Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 UCLA Pac. Basin L..J. 131, 185-87 (1993) (discussing the reasons for government control over economies in socialist countries).

48. See Bersani, supra note 47, at 305-30.6. See also, Xiao Yu, China: Backing for State Firms, S. China Morning Post, Nov. 7, 1994, at 4. Beijing is able to squelch the people's demand for investment opportunities, while remaining in control of their investments. See Bersani, supra note 47, at 306.

49. See Henry J. Graham, Foreign Investment Laws of China and the United States: A Comparative Study, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & P., 253, 270 (1996).

50. See id.

51. See Yasheng Huang, Why China Will Not Collapse, 99 Foreign Pol'y 6 (1995).

52. See Franklin L. Lavin, When Toasting the Mayor, Don't Mention Democracy, Asian Wall St. J., June 16, 1994, at 8.

53. Joint ventures are the main vehicle for direct foreign investment in China. There are basically four types of direct foreign investments in the PRC: equity joint ventures, cooperative operations, wholly-owned ventures, and cooperative development ventures. See Khan, World Bank Discussion Papers, China and Mongolian Department Series: Patterns of Direct Foreign Investment in China, 36-38 (1991).

54. Global Economic and Technological Change: Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, and China: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 116, 120 (1993) (paper submitted by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Joint Economic Committee) [hereinafter Congress Jt. Economic Comm. Rep.].

55. Henny Sender, Party of the First Part: China Tries to Improve Contract Law, Far. E. Econ. Rev., Feb. 11, 1993, at 42.

56. Id. at 42.

57. See Marcus W. Brauchli, China's New Economy Spurs Legal Reforms, Hopes for Democracy, Wall St. J., June 20, 1995, at A8.

58. See Graham, supra note 49, at 268.

59. "An exact accounting of the amount of foreign capital investment." Graham, supra note 49, at 268.

60. 1987 WL 124775, China Law File # 0438, Provisional Regulations for the Proportion of Registered Capital to Total Amount of Investment of Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, March 1, 1987.

61. See Chinese Rules Target Joint-Venture Fraud, Asian Wall St. J., April 5, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Rules for Fraud].

62. 1987 WL 124775, China Law File # 0438, Provisional Regulations for the Proportion of Registered Capital to Total Amount of Investment of Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, March 1, 1987, 2.

63. See Rules of Fraud, supra note 62, at 3.

64. See id, at 3.

65. See id. at 3.

66. See Jonas Alsen, supra note 1, at 5.

67. See PRC Const. art. 10.

68. See PRC Const. art. 13.

69. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 38. The client company who leases the equipment is called lessee in this article. The leasing company themselves prefer to call the lessee "the end-user," since according to the leasing contract the lessee will normally end up as owner of equipment at the expiration of the lease. See id.

70. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 38.

71. See id.

72. See id.

73. See id.

74. See id.

75. See id.

76. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 38.

77. See id. at 39.

78. Urban Real Estate Management Law of the PRC, 8th Nat'l People's Cong., 8th Sess., art. 22 P1 (effective 1995) [hereinafter UML].

79. See UML, supra note 78, art. 22 P2.

80. Provisional Measures on Administration of Allocated Land Use Rights, art. 30 (1992).

81. Id.

82. Provisional Measures on Administration of Allocated Land Use Rights, art. 5,6 (1992). See also UML, supra note 78, art. 36-45 (effective 1995).

83. See UML, supra note 78, art. 17.

84. See UML, supra note 78, art. 38.

85. See id. The Land Administration Bureau of the municipal or county People's Government is the grantor of the land-use contracts. See id.

86. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 50. All normal structures are returned with the land. "Non-standard" constructions are often required to be demolished and cleared by the time the land is turned over to the State. See id. See Measures of Shanghai Municipality on the Compensatory Transfer of Land Use Rights, art. 41, Shanghai Municipal People's Gov't (1987). See id.

87. See UML, supra note 78, art. 21.

88. See id.

89. See id. art. 41.

90. See id. art. 42.

91. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 50.

92. See id.

93. Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Grant and Assignment of the Right to Use State Land in Urban Areas, art. 26(1990).

94. See UML, supra note 78, art. 19.

95. Id.

96. See UML, supra note 78, art. 19.

97. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 49. If the land user is not pleased with the compensation, he can sue the government. However, the courts are still under the influence of the state and might or might not be of help. See id.

98. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 41.

99. See id. (interviewing Gernot G. Kluss, General Manager, China Universal Leasing, Beijing, PRC (Apr. 4, 1995)).

100. See id.

101. See id.

102. See id. (interviewing Ludwig Fella, Assistant Manager, China Universal Leasing, Beijing, PRC (June 9, 1995)).

103. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 41. See also Will Dennis, Capital Contribution and Financing, in The Life and Death of A Joint Venture in China 51, 61 (Duncan Freeman ed., 1994).

104. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 4-5.

105. See W.J.F. Jenner & Allen Lane, The Tyranny of History, The Roots of China's Crises 139-40 (1992).

106. See Jagtenberg & de Roo, supra note 15, at 27, 30.

107. See Matthias Steinmann & Dunja Stadtmann, Das neue chinesche Schiedsgerichtsbarkeitsgesetz: Einfuhrung und Ubersetzung , China Aktuell , Jan. 1995, at 45.

108. See Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded factors in the Transformation from Hierarchy to Market 1978-1989 , 5 J. Chinese L. 143, 160 (1991).

109. See U.S. Const. art. IV, s 1.

110. See Song Yanrong, Difficulties in Justice Courts' Law-Enforcement, Feb. 20, 1995, at 4, translated and micro filmed on F.B.I.S.-CHI 95 - 054, Article Views Difficulty in Enforcing Court Rulings, Mar. 21, 1995, at 57-58.

111. See Kathy Chen, China (A Special Report): Business Plan; The Extent of the Law, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1993, at S10.

112. See Marcus W. Brauchli, China's New Economy Spurs Legal Reforms, Hopes for Democracy, Wall St. J., June 20, 1995, at A8.

113. See the Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, U.S.-P.R.C., 34 I.L.M. 676.

114. See Hua Chen, China Talks on Arbitration Rules, South China Morning Post, March 14, 1993 (quoting Michael Moser, head of the China Department of Baker and McKenzie).

115. See Alsen, supra note 1, at 13-14.

116. See Larry L. Drumm, Changing Money: Foreign Exchange Reform in the People's Republic of China, 18 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 359, 362, [hereinafter Drumm] (citing International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 107 (1981)). Within 10 years of 1949, the renminbi was the only remaining currency circulated in China. See id. William Triplett, The Banking Industry, in Doing Business With China, 190, 191-192 (William W. Whitson ed., 1974) ("Prior to 1947, the Communists issued various currencies in the regions of their authority.... The last non-RMB [renminbi] notes were withdrawn from Tibet in 1959.") (footnotes omitted).

117. See id. Although the Chinese adopted the Soviet central planning model for their economic policy, the actual level of planning was substantially less detailed than other centrally planned economies. Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do With It?: Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 1, 5 (1991). See id.

118. See Cheng Yuan, Changing Patterns in Chinese Foreign Trade Law and Institutions 45 (1991).

119. See id. at 45-46.

120. See Drumm, supra note 116.

121. See Michael Brent Nelson, An Analysis of Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China in the Aftermath of the Sino-U.S. Tax Agreement, 1 Transnat'l L. 547, 548 (1988).

122. Id. at 548.

123. Id. at 549.

124. The State where the investment is located.

125. See Nelson, supra note 121, at 549.

126. See id.

127. See Drumm, supra note 116, at 361.

128. See id.

129. Harry Sender, Two Price China, Far E. Econ. Rev., June 17, 1993, at 64.

130. See Doron P. Levin, AMC, China Agree on 2-Month Halt of Jeep Production, Wall St. J, May 23, 1986, at 25. For examples of other joint ventures with foreign exchange problems, see Julia Leung, Westerners' Joint Ventures in China Encounter Bureaucratic Delays, Foreign-Exchange Blocks, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 38.

131. See Joseph Kahn, China's Auto Industry Gains Momentum: Pioneering Investor Snaps Up Parts Plant as Beijing Sets Ambitious Goals, Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 1. Beijing Jeep was the West's first manufacturing venture in China. AMC produced the first Jeep after only 7 years of arduous negotiations. The enterprise almost failed when the Chinese authorities didn't make foreign currency available to purchase Jeep kits from the company's American base or to convert profits from the sale of "Beijing Jeeps." At the eleventh hour ("[w]e were about 20 minutes away from calling it quits"), the Chinese finally relented, granting a special waiver to convert Chinese yuan into hard currency. The result was large profits and uninterrupted production; 72,399 "Beijing Jeeps" were produced in 1993. Id.

132. See Levin, supra note 130, at 25.

133. In 1992, Beijing Jeep Corp. had the second highest sales volume among joint ventures in China. Its profit of 422 million yuan was also the second highest. See Sarah Lubman, Round and Round: To Survive Your Business Negotiations, You'll Need Patience, Skill and Perhaps an Extra Coat, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1993, at S4.

134. See Jerome A. Cohen & Stuart A. Valentine, Recent Legislation Assisting Foreign Investors to Solve Their Hard Currency Problem: Import Substitution and Other Options, 1988 B.U. L. Rev. 519, 521 (1988) ("According to Chinese government statistics, only one-third of the 4,000 foreign investment enterprises operating in China by the end of 1987 were able to balance their foreign exchange accounts.") (footnote omitted). Mary Lee, Foreign Investment: New Rules Help but it's a Struggle For Some, Far E. Econ. Rev., Mar. 20, 1986, at 87-88.

135. See Drumm, supra note 116, at 369 (citing, Sino Xenophilia, Survey: When China Wakes, at 14, in Economist , Nov. 28, 1992).

136. See Drumm, supra note 116, at 370. As in the Beijing Jeep case noted above. See Leung, supra note 130, at 38 (Shanghai official finds the number of industrial projects unsatisfactory as over 60% of investment pledged for Shanghai was either for hotel or office construction). See id.

137. See Drumm, supra note 116, at 370. There are six regulations which relate to the establishment of alternatives for ventures not concentrating on exports: (1) Regulations of the State Council Concerning the Issue of Balancing Foreign Exchange Receipts and Disbursements by Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (promulgated Jan. 16, 1986); (2) Provisions of the State Council Regulations Concerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment (promulgated October 11, 1986); (3) Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade for Enterprises with Foreign Investment to Solve the Balance of Foreign Exchange Receipts and Expenditures by Purchasing Domestic Products for Export (promulgated Jan. 20, 1987, regulation expanded the benefits of the Joint Venture Balancing Provisions and added wholly foreign-owned enterprises); (4) Trial Procedures Concerning the Use of Products for Import Substitution (promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial People's Government, Dec. 8, 1986); (5) Measures Concerning Import Substitution for the Products of Chinese-Foreign Equity and Cooperative Joint Ventures (issued Oct. 19, 1987); (6) Measures for the Administration of Import Substitution for the Mechanical and Electrical Products of Chinese-Foreign Equity and Cooperative Joint Ventures (issued in Oct. 1987), available in Commercial, Business and Trade Laws: People's Republic of China (Owen D. Nee, Jr. ed., 1991).

138. A survey published in 1993 indicates that the swap markets are the leading method for obtaining foreign exchange. See John Frisbie & Richard Brecher, A Tough Balancing Act, China Bus. Rev., Nov./Dec. 1993, at 11-12 (close to three-quarters of foreign invested enterprises reported using the swap markets which provided 55% of their foreign exchange needs, 14 firms reporting 70%).

139. See Drumm, supra note 116, at 371.

140. See Sander Tideman, Dealing with Nonconvertibility and Other Financial Aspects of Doing Business in China, E. Asian Executive Rep., July 15, 1993, at 17.

141. See Drumm, supra note 116, at 372.

142. See id.

143. See China's Currency Swap Market, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1992.

144. See Virginia Davis & Carlos Yi, Balancing Foreign Exchange, China Bus. Rev., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 14, 18.

145. See id. at 12 ("the swap rates themselves often move according to currency supply and demand in the individual swap centers").

146. See Drumm, supra note 116, at 373-374, (citing, Henrik Hansen, China Agrees to Increase Market Access for U.S. Exports, E. Asian Executive Rep., Oct. 15, 1992, at 16. But see Investment-Related Restrictions Based on Industrial Policy Draw Criticism from the U.S., E. Asian Executive Rep., May 15, 1994, at 12 ("While import substitution lists may no longer be circulated, the report [from U.S. officials in Beijing] states that both the capital budgeting process and the foreign exchange system are biased in favor of local products in that they tend to make buyers exhaust all local procurement possibilities before imports are approved."). Id.

147. Drumm, supra note 116, at 377.

148. Amy E. Yates, Comment, The Role of the Black Market in China's International Financial System, 7 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 833, 843 (1986).

149. See id.

150. See Elizabeth Cheng, Arbitrage in China, Far E. Econ. Rev., May 21, 1992, at 44.

151. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (the United States Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).

152. Equity joint ventures are the most popular of the four, accounting for 49% of the total contracted foreign direct investment in 1989. Cooperative operations comprise 41% of that total. See Khan, World Bank Discussion Papers, China and Mongolian Department Series: Patterns of Direct Foreign Investment in China 36-38 (1991). Wholly-owned ventures with full control by foreign company are the least popular, accounting for only 6.8% of the total contracted direct foreign investment in 1989, largely because Chinese authority did not consider this method of foreign investment as useful in contributing to the transfer of technology and management skills. See id.

153. See John Impert, A Program for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 Int'l L. 1009, 1022 (1990).

154. 15 U.S.C. s 78m(b)(6).

155. See Norman Givant, The Sword that Shields, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Protects American Investments in China, China Bus. Rev., May 1994, at 29, available in LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File.

156. 2.1 Reformers in Control: Looming Dangers, China Hand, July 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Eiuch File.

157. See id.

158. See Stephen Hutcheon, The Great Crime of the People, Age (Melbourne), Jan. 14, 1995, at 24, available in LEXIS, Reuters Textline, World Library, Txtlne File. "Corruption comes in many guises in China. It is manifested in arbitrary levies on farmers and workers. It comes in the shape of facilitation fees for services and favors. It's old-fashioned embezzlement, fraud and smuggling; it's using Government expenses to pay for private entertainment; using public funds to buy an imported car; giving preferential treatment to friends and relatives." Id.

159. Julia Leung, Greased Palms Lubricate Wheels in China, Wall St. J., July 20, 1989, at 10.

160. See Daniel Southerland, Foreigners See Rise in Bribes in China, Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1987, at A1. In 1987, a U.S. businessman told the Washington Post that the amount of the bribe involved depends on the size of the contract. It can range from a few hundred dollars to $10,000 initially, often with subsequent requests. See id.

161. See id. An American businessman said bribes often consist of "splitting a sales commission with a Chinese official." A Japanese executive commented that children of high-level cadres who were in a position to help foreigners obtain contracts "began asking straight out for money." See id.

162. Brewer S. Stone, Manager's Journal: Beating China's Rapacious Profiteers, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1993, at A14.

163. Corruption: Getting Tough Pays Off, Bus. Int'l China, Jan. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Buchin File.

164. See id.

165. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(d), 78ff(b), (c).

166. The FCPA provides no guidance as to subsidiary compliance or the minority U.S. investors' liability. See id.

167. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3).

168. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2), (h)(3).

169. See S. Gregory Joy, Application of Selected American Laws to United States Company Transacting Business in Kuwait: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Anti-boycott Legislation. 43 Mercer L. Rev. 691, 694 (1992).

170. See William F. Pendergast, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview of Almost Twenty Years of Foreign Bribery Prosecutions, in 1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 102.001, 102.003 (July 1995).

171. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2)(B), (C).

172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a).

173. See Delia Poon, Exposure to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Guide For U.S. Company with Activities in the People's Republic of China to Minimize Liability, 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 327, 332.

174. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b)-(c), -2(b)-(c).

175. See Henry R. Zheng, The Evolving Role of Lawyers and Legal Practice in China, 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 473, 488 (1988). Beijing University alone opened its law faculty in 1974 and therefore a small number graduated from there in 1978. See id.

176. See Marcus W. Brauchli, China's New Economy Spurs Legal Reforms, Hopes for Democracy, Wall St. J., June 20, 1995, at A8.

177. See Glenn A. Pitman & James P. Sanford, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Revisited: Attempting to Regulate "Ethical Bribes" in Global Business, 30 Int'l J. Purchasing & Materials Mgmt. 15 (1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File.

178. See Poon, supra note 173, at 341.

179. See Foreign Company Wrestle with Continuing Problem of Corruption in China, Bus. Int'l, July 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Business File.

180. See id.

181. See id.

182. See Southerland, supra note 160, at A1.

183. See Givant, supra note 155, at 29.

184. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), -2(f). The procedure is codified at 28 C.F.R. § 80.1-.16 (1995).

185. A "no enforcement action" opinion issued by the DOJ only gives rise to a presumption of conformity with the FCPA. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence that information submitted with the opinion request was not complete and accurate, or that the actual conduct was not the one described in the opinion request. See 28 C.F.R. § 80.10 (1995).

186. See Derek Devgun, Crossborder Joint Ventures: A Survey of International Antitrust Considerations, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 681.

187. Anti-Unfair Competition Law, art. 15, adopted at the Third Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on Sept. 2, 1993, and effective from Dec. 1, 1993, translated and reprinted in China L. & Prac., Nov. 18, 1993, at 31, 31-37 [hereinafter Anti-Unfair Competition Law]. The Anti- Unfair Competition Law is also selectively translated, reprinted, and analyzed in Tianlong Yu, An Anti-Unfair Competition Law Without a Core: An Introductory Comparison Between U.S. Antitrust Law and the New Law of the People's Republic of China, 4 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 315, 323 (1994).

188. Anti-Unfair Competition Law, supra note 187, art. 27.

189. See Yu, supra note 187, at 325. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. '1 et seq. is a United States Anti-trust law.

190. See Paul B. Stephan, Et. Al., International Business and Economics, Law and Policy 661, (Michie Law Publishers, 2d ed. 1996), citing, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942). The Sherman Act does not authorize an injunction to forbid enforcement of California Agricultural Prorate Act, which established a State agency to cartelize, inter alia, the raisin market. See id.

191. See Anti-Unfair Competition Law, supra note 187, art. 11.

192. See Levin, supra note 130, at 8.

193. See Alfred E. Eckes, Trading American Interests, 71 Foreign Aff. 135, 137 (1992).

194. Id.

195. See Levin, supra note 130, at 8.

196. Id.

197. See Jack A. Goldstone, The Coming Chinese Collapse, 99 Foreign Pol. 41 (1995).

198. Reason for being.

199. See Graham, supra note 50, at 271.

200. Sarah Lubman, Round and Round: To Survive Your Business Negotiations, You'll Need Patience, Skill and Perhaps an Extra Coat, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1993, at S4.

201. Graham, supra note 49, at 271.

202. Id.

203. Id.

204. See Henry Sender, Party of the First Part: China Tries to Improve Contract Law, Far. E. Econ. Rev, Feb. 11, 1993, at 42.

205. See Kathy Chen, China (A Special Report): Business Plan; The Extent of the Law, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1993, at S10.

206. See Levin, supra note 130, at 8.

207. Id. Moreover, as "[o]nly senior officials have the authority to spend money, your negotiating "partner" is really only an intermediary to the decision-makers. Sarah Lubman, Round and Round: To Survive Your Business Negotiations, You'll Need Patience, Skill and Perhaps an Extra Coat, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1993, at S4.

208. Id.

209. See Chen, supra note 205, at S10.

210. See John Bussey & James McGregor, What, Why and How: For the Host of Questions That Will No Doubt Spring to Mind, Some Considered Answers Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1993, at S27.

211. See Levin, supra note 130, at 8.

212. See id.

213. See id. These tactics may be exemplified by a recent episode in negotiations between an Australian company and Chinese officials. After four painful years of negotiations, the Chinese brought a new negotiator and new contract to their Australian counterparts. The Australians were understandably furious; they canceled the deal. Within a week of their bluff being called, the Chinese reinstated the original contract's terms. See id.

214. See id.

215. See id.

216. Basic provisions not addressed here include: leasing, products, know-how, trademarks, major decision making, object and scope, transferability, liability, powers, management, committees, personnel, quality control, bank accounts, location of plant, procurement and installation of capital equipment, specific licenses, limitations of rights, training, ownership and registration, grants, markings, inspections, responsibilities, transfer of know-how, financial affairs and accounting, term and liquidation, confidentiality, property rights, and force majeure.

217. The Lanham Act protects U.S. Trademarks.